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This study evaluates the impact of expansions to family policy by the political party 
Fidesz on fertility in Hungary since 2010 and tests the effects of key socioeconomic and cultural 
characteristics on fertility in Central and Eastern Europe. To do so, we estimate difference in 
differences linear regression and Probit models for the recent birth of a child in households in 10 
Central and Eastern European countries from 2002-18, and a Poisson model for the number of 
children given birth to by women in a subsample of these countries for 2006 and 2018. We 
introduce a partial theory of choice that provides an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive ways a 
person can choose to have a child to develop novel hypotheses. We find the policies modestly 
increased fertility initially but later had no significant effect, and that Roman Catholic, more 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Fertility in Hungary has been stubbornly below replacement level since the late 1970s 
and below an average of 1.6 children per woman every year since 1995, despite the country 
consistently having one of the most generous family policy regimes in Central Europe for most 
of the period since the 1960s (Vida 2019). Consistently low fertility like in Hungary leads to 
many socioeconomic problems, including a shrinking economy and an aging society with less 
social security mechanisms for the elderly. The political party Fidesz has continuously expanded 
the family policy system to encourage childbearing since taking power in 2010, through an 
increase in the amounts and eligibility of allowances and tax benefits for parents, availability of 
part-time work for mothers of young children, childcare and early education services, and 
support for housing and purchasing a car. 
Statistical studies have suggested that family policy before and after 2010 has slightly 
and temporarily increased fertility in Hungary (Gábos 2005), (Spéder, Murinkó and Sz. Oláh 
2020). In addition to policy changes, the sweeping transition to a market economy in the 1990s 
and a cultural shift to Western individualism are among other major factors that have influenced 
fertility in Hungary since the end of socialism in 1990. Although the Fidesz policies try to 
alleviate the financial obstacles of childbearing for potential parents, fertility has not responded 
remarkably judging by aggregate statistics like the general fertility rate (GFR) and total fertility 
rate (TFR). This study tries to answer the following questions. Did the Fidesz family policy 
changes have a positive marginal effect on fertility in Hungary? Beyond macroeconomic and 
personal financial conditions, what sociocultural factors might be preventing replacement 
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fertility in Hungary and why? Do these sociocultural factors indeed have the hypothesized effect 
on fertility in Hungary? 
 To answer these questions, we look at data from the European Social Survey on 
households and women in Hungary and nine other Central and East European countries from 
2002-18. As measures of fertility, for households we test whether the household added a child 
who is one year old or younger at the time of the survey, or whether it added an additional child 
a year old or younger at the time of the survey1, and for women we test the effects on the number 
of children she has given birth to in her lifetime. In addition to testing for the effect of the policy 
on births in households in each year after 2010 individually and controlling for the fixed effects 
for countries and years, we include a rich set of demographic, economic and cultural attitudinal 
and behavioral variables informed by the literature as controls. This includes the subjective 
perception of household income, the respondent’s attitude towards tradition and pleasure, and 
whether they are Roman Catholic and attend a service at least monthly, which we term “devoutly 
Catholic” (Kapitány and Spéder 2009), (Szalma and Takács 2015), (Hubert 2015).  
We hypothesized a modest increase of our measures of fertility for 2012 and each year 
after from the base year of 2008, in the treatment group of Hungary. For 2016 and after, we 
predicted a greater increase of fertility because of new labor laws and rules for allowances 
introduced in 2014 that significantly reconciled work and school with childrearing for mothers of 
children under three. We likewise predicted a modest increase of fertility when an individual is 
married, Roman Catholic, devoutly Catholic, values tradition, and the more sufficient they 
perceive their household income. Conversely, we hypothesized a modest decrease in fertility for 
 
1
That is, if the household has at least two children; one of which is one or younger, or born in the last two years, 
exclusive. 
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the more the respondent valued fun and pleasure in life, and if a woman was more highly 
educated and if she worked more hours at her last job. To test our hypotheses, we estimate a 
multivariate regression and Probit on the sample of households and a Poisson models on the 
sample of women. 
 We find the expected increase in fertility for the policy in years 2012-13 from 2008 in 
households, but see no significant effect for the years after, despite the expansion of part-time 
work for mothers and of generous maternity allowances to students from 2014-18. For models on 
the sample of households, the hypothesized effects of the head of the household being married, 
Catholic, valuing tradition, and fun and pleasure in life held. However, being devoutly Catholic 
had a significantly negative effect, even after controlling for age. The perception of a higher 
income actually predicted a lower chance of having a child age one or younger in the household. 
For our sample of fertile women in 2006 and 2018, we found a woman had fewer children over 
the course of her lifetime if she was in Hungary during the family policy expansions than before 
or outside Hungary in both periods, and confirm much of the same results of the effects of the 
socioeconomic variables on fertility as found in the households models. 
The policies attempt to meet the financial needs of families to have a child, a condition 
on childbearing that people have traditionally had, but they also address the new condition many 
women have on childbearing of working part- or full-time while with a young child, though our 
results suggest they made little difference. This implies that there are other conditions potential 
parents have on childbearing that are not being met, or that potential parents are not trying to 
realize their chosen goal even if all their conditions are being met by the policies or other 
sources, from the mother having part-time work to sufficient household income. This firstly 
warrants a deeper study into what these other conditions might be, or why people are not trying 
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to realize their childbearing desires beyond traditional economic conditions and the newer 
cultural preference of women to seek fulfillment outside the home. This being said, even if we 
could find these intractable conditions and motives for acting to realize childbearing, it must be 
determined if government policy could ever meet these conditions within ethical bounds. In our 
study, we find evidence that being Catholic or more traditional determines having fewer 
restrictions on childbearing. However, it is doubtful whether a government can influence its 
people to have deeper seated cultural attitudes, and most instruments to do so are unethical. 
Although family policy in Hungary may sustain fertility through meeting the baseline conditions 
for childbearing of many, our study reconfirms that it cannot be strong enough on its own to 
bring births back to replacement level. 
Our study will begin with a description of the trends of the outcome of fertility in 
aggregate terms in Hungary and Eastern Europe, followed by a brief literature review of studies 
giving partial answer to some of our questions. We continue with a detailed description of the 
developments of the features of the Hungarian family policy system that have been in place for 
any period since 1990, to justify that the expansions Fidesz has made should have a greater effect 
on fertility than previous provisions. We then develop a partial theory of choice using symbolic 
logic that concludes with an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive ways to choose or desire 
something to inform our hypotheses. After, we apply this theory to argue for and to rule out 
some hypotheses by complementing empirical knowledge on determinants of fertility. We then 
state the features of our raw data, the measures of fertility and independent variables we adapted 
from it and connect them to our hypotheses. Next, we describe our models and present and 
discuss the statistical aspects of our results from our regressions. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of the relationship of fertility with Fidesz family policy changes and sociocultural 
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phenomena as shown in our statistical analysis, reevaluate some of our hypotheses, and consider 













































CHAPTER 2: FERTILITY TRENDS IN HUNGARY AND EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 
1960 
Fertility in Hungary since the 1990 has been characterized by an overall drop in annual 
rates among all cohorts and the postponement of childbearing to a later age among women, with 
some indication of the decrease of births across the lifespan of women. The total fertility rate is 
the average number of children a woman would have in her lifetime if she bore children at the 
age- specific fertility rate in each period of her fertile career2. 2.1 is usually considered to be the 
minimum TFR a population needs to have in order to replace itself at the modern mortality rate 
(Goldstone 2012). 
We can look at the TFR in Hungary since 1960, the average TFR for the Visegrád (V4) 
countries except for Poland of Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary3, the V4 average from 1990 on, 
and of the ten Central and East European countries we will estimate statistical models on later. 
These countries are the V4, Austria, Estonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Ukraine. Hungarian 
fertility was generally slightly below the average TFR of the V4 without Poland until 1990, when 
it started to follow in near lockstep with the V4 average. It went below two children per mother 
in the 1960s in part due to coercive efforts of the state to include women in the workforce and 
the re-legalization of abortion in 1956 in response to the Hungarian revolution (Spéder 2016). 
 
2
The TFR is the sum of the fertility rates for women of each age in the fertile life span of a woman, defined 15-44 
here and in demography usually. When the summand fertility rates are for women of an age range greater than a 
year, each summand is multiplied by the number of years in that age range, since the age-specific rate only shows 
how many children a woman would have on average in just one year. The age-specific fertility rate is  
 
3
The Visegrád Group as an institution only began in 1991. We use the term only as a marker. 
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Fertility likely in part responded in 1967 and 1973 to the introduction of two major features of 
Hungarian family policy that remain to this day, the first a fixed-amounted paid maternity leave 
for previously working mothers (the “GYES”), and the second housing benefits and family 
allowances as part of the new population policy, respectively. Later in 1985, a maternity leave 
allowance (the extant “GYED”4) whose amount was fixed to around 70% of the mother’s 
previous salary was introduced, which helped slightly increase and stabilize the TFR at close to 
1.7 for five years. Nevertheless, these spikes were temporary, and the TFR significantly subsided 
due to the shocks of the transition to a market economy in 1990. 
Figure 1:  Total Fertility Rate, Hungary and regional averages 




We will discuss the development of provisions and eligibility for these allowances in Chapter 3. 
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 In addition to the decrease of the average birth rate across all age groups from the 1970s 
on, the composition of births has shifted to women in older age groups. Until the 1990s, the 
majority of births were to women between the ages of 20 and 24, at close to a rate of 150 births 
per 1000 women. But by 2000, the sum of births in each age group dropped remarkably, and 
most births occurred to mothers between 25 and 29. The greatest amount of births to any age 
group was around 150 per 1000 women in 1990, but only 100 in 2000. By 2010, most births 
were to women between 30 and 34. The Visegrád average has followed a similar trend since 
1990, though with a slightly higher age-specific fertility rate for each age group. 
Figure 2: Age-specific fertility rates across the fertile career for Hungary and V4 by decade 
 
Source: Eurostat Population Data, own calculations (Eurostat 2020) 
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 The later a woman has her first child, the less likely it is she will have as many children 
in her lifetime as she would have had had she started earlier. Merely from the distribution of all 
births among women alone we cannot know if women in general began having children later 
from 1990 on. To test this, we provide the mean age of women at first childbirth in Figure 3. The 
large drop in annual birthrates in the 1990s is partially due to postponement and not a large 
change in the total amount of births in the lifetime of mothers. The women ages 20-24 who 
contributed to the large drop in net fertility in 1990 went on to have nearly 1.9 children on 
average in their lifetimes by the time they finished their fertile careers at 45, according to the 
completed cohort fertility rate of Hungarian women born in 1970, or the average number of 
children born in the lifetime of mothers born in 1970 (Sobotka, et al. 2018, 655). Therefore, the 
early annual fertility decline does not indicate a general trend towards low completed fertility for 
those years, but instead only shows postponement with the ultimate accomplishment of near-
replacement fertility. However, by 2013 the rate of childless women among those born in 1975 
was 19.3% and likely to stay near that rate when this cohort turned 45 due to childbearing after 
38 being uncommon, as opposed to the rate of 8.5% of women born in 19635 (Spéder 2016, 
173), and so the lifetime abandonment or minimization, and not postponement, of childbearing 
may be expanding in cohorts born after 1970. Given declining annual and completed fertility, the 
higher mean age at first childbirth indicates that female cohorts ending their careers in at least the 
next decade are much more likely to be childless or only have one child. 
 
5
We could not obtain this data first-hand for the end of the 1975 cohort’s fertile career in 2020, Spéder received it 
for 2013 from a colleague. 
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Figure 3: Mean age of women at birth of first child, Hungary and regional averages 
 























CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY POLICY IN HUNGARY 
The policies in Hungary under consideration in this study are those that establish and 
execute the provisions of a positive right to people who may conceive, influence the conception 
of, or take care of, children. We will call these family policies, since they are intended to help 
form and strengthen the whole family and are not merely aimed at increasing birth rates as 
implied by “pro-natalist”. Together they are called the “Child Support System” (Család 
Támogatási Rendszer) in Hungarian (Szombati 2019). A positive right is when the target citizen 
can oblige the state, an employer, or another party to perform something of benefit to them in 
preparation of or after having a child. The rights established by family policy are also called 
“subjective rights” in Hungarian, German, Polish and other languages of countries that use a civil 
legal system, which means that the obligation to the state is only towards particular persons who 
have entered a certain civil-legal relationship6 (Vida 2019), (OHCHR 2015). 
A detailed statement of the provisions of these policies will only be given for those 
whose effect we would like to measure, with an overview of those from 1990-2010 sufficient to 
distinguish their projected efficacy from the later ones. If a policy remains until the treatment 
period, we will state its developments in the same section, and if it ceased but was replaced by a 
similar policy, we will talk about the replacement policy in succession. There are four types of 
 
6
These are contrasted with the idea of “objective right”, which is the set of universal obligations whose benefactors 
are not necessarily specified. Because a right in Modern English is defined in part by the possessor of the right, who 
in some cases benefits by holding it, and objective right does not always define a situation where anyone benefits 
from the fulfillment of obligations or creates an obligation for someone, the term is usually not quantified to 
describe another sphere of legal entitlements or capacities as the English term “right” encompasses (Byrd and 
Hruschka 2010). 
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family policy found in Hungary. The first is payments and tax benefits, the second labor market 
benefits, the third housing and transportation benefits, and the fourth childcare and early 
education centers. 
3.1 Allowances and Tax Benefits 
Payments and tax benefits comprise the oldest, most financed, and most available and 
beneficial set of family policy provisions in Hungary. We will consider them first by whether 
they require the mother to be previously insured by state social insurance, and then by the order 
in which they are received in the child’s lifetime, then their duration, amount and conditions. 
Social insurance is comprised of health insurance and the pension scheme, and one 
receives social insurance if they receive either. The one-time Maternity Grant or ANYT 
(Anyasági Támogatás) has been available since 1998 for each birth to previously uninsured 
mothers who have received pre-natal care at least four times before giving birth, with the amount 
calculated off of the minimum pension and higher for twins (Vida 2019), (Zagorskis 2018), 
(Branyiczki, et al. 2019). In 1967, the Childcare Support or GYES (Gyermekgondozási Segély 
1967-2015, Gyermekgondozást Segitő Ellátás 2016-) was introduced, surviving to this day. The 
first paid-maternity leave was introduced in 1891 (Kapitány and Makay 2014). This is a fixed 
sum paid monthly to the mother until the child is three years old (2.5 years at the very start) or 10 
for severely sick or disabled children. It was temporarily only available for the child’s first two 
years from 2009-10 (Spéder 2016, 194).  
Its amount was originally a percentage of the mean of female net earnings in the country, 
at 39% in 1967 and 1993 and 26% in 2006, but in 2008 was set to the lowest monthly pension 
payment, or 28,500 Forint (Ft), and since unchanged. The amount was tied to inflation from 
1995-8 (Spéder 2016), (Spéder, Murinkó and Sz. Oláh 2020),(Vida 2019). It was the main 
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maternity leave payment until the announcement of the GYED in 1984, and was only available 
to previously employed mothers until 1990, when it became available to the previously 
unemployed and uninsured (Spéder 2016, 188). From 1995-8, the Bokros austerity package 
made eligibility means-tested, so claims and reception decreased (Spéder 2016). In 1990, the 
recipient was allowed part-time employment after the child turned one. In 2004, the social-
democratic Gyurcsány government allowed recipients to work full-time after the child turned one 
(Raț, Szikra and Inglot 2012), (Branyiczki, et al. 2019). 
The Childrearing Support or GYET (Gyermeknevelési Támogatás) was introduced in 
1993 and is a payment made to a parent or guardian of three or more children from the third to 
eight year of her youngest child (Vida 2019). Its amount is the same as that of the GYES, and at 
first the recipient could not work more than 20 hours a week, until this was increased to 30 hours 
a week, or no cap for at-home work (Vida 2019), (Spéder, Murinkó and Sz. Oláh 2020) 
(Kapitány and Makay 2014).  
The Family Allowance or CSAP (Családi Pótlék) is the current incarnation, starting in 
1972, of family allowances that have been offered to families since 1912, its amount increasing 
for each child up to the third child, and whether the recipient is a single parent. In 1980 the 
average amount was 25% of the average wage, and in 1989 the amount was significantly 
increased again. By 2000, the amount in real terms decreased to 38% of its amount in 1990 due 
to inflation. It was increased 20% in 2002 and annually until 2008, when it was double the 2002 
amount (Raț, Szikra and Inglot 2012). Since 2008 the base amount has not changed, but amounts 
were slightly differentiated for non-school age and school-age children in 2010 (OHCHR 2015). 
It is provided until the youngest child finishes secondary school or until they are 20, or 23 for 
severely disabled or sick children (Vida 2019). At least one family head had to be employed until 
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1990, when it was offered to unemployed family heads (Spéder 2016). Families had to have at 
least two children to receive it until 1986, when families with one child could receive it until the 
child was six, with eligibility maintained by having another child (Kapitány and Makay, Family 
Policies: Hungary 2014). Although 99% of parents received the CSAP in 2014, and most 
continue to, its amount is small and needs to be combined with the more generous GYED, which 
has received the greatest increase in amount and availability. 
The Pregnancy and Confinement Benefit or TGYÁS (Terhességi-Gyermekágyi Segély), 
changed into the Infant Care Allowance in 2015 or CSED (Csecsemőgondozási Díj), has existed 
since at least 1973, when it was expanded along with other provisions as part of the new 
“population policy” (Népességi Politika). It is a payment received up to the 168th day of the child 
and at least since 1998 set to 70% of the mother’s prior earnings with a cap. After this, a 
previously insured and employed mother can receive the Childcare Allowance or GYED 
(Gyermekgondozási Díj), introduced in 1985 as the first wage-adjusted childcare benefit. It has 
always been offered from the end of the CSED until the child turned three. It was first 75% of 
the mother’s average prior earnings or 65% if she worked for a period shorter than a threshold, 
and is 70% today (Spéder 2016), (Vida 2019). It had a cap of half the average wage 1990-2010, 
but was changed to 70% of twice the minimum wage soon after 2010, which in 2015 was 43% 
higher than the 2010 cap amount (Raț, Szikra and Inglot 2012), (Vida 2019), (OHCHR 2015). Its 
value in real terms decreased with high inflation 1990-5, and from 1995-8 the socialist-liberal 
coalition ended it and replaced it with a means-tested yet wage-related allowance available for 
only the child’s first year, until the first Orbán government restored it in 1998 (Spéder 2016), 
(Vida 2019).  
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Until 2014, the mother could not work at any time while receiving the GYED, but in 
2014 she could work after the child turned one, and then in 2016 for the whole reception period, 
or right after receiving the CSED (Kapitány and Makay 2014), (OHCHR 2015). In 2014, the 
Fidesz government introduced GYED “Extra”, allowing a parent to keep receiving the GYED if 
they begin receiving another benefit for a newborn, extending reception until the child’s third 
year in the case of twins. Significantly, Fidesz introduced the Diplomás GYED or “Degree” 
GYED for mothers enrolled at least two semesters in a college before having a child, a generous 
fixed-sum that was provided for the child’s first year until 2018, when it was made available for 
the normal two-year duration (OHCHR 2015). In 2019, the monthly amount was 104,000 Ft for 
undergraduates and 137,000 Ft for graduate students, or $330 and $434 respectively, on 
November 1st, 2020 (Vida 2019). 
Income tax deductions, or a reduction of the taxable income base, were introduced in 
1988 for families with three or more children, and in 1992 they were expanded to families with 
one or two children (OHCHR 2015), (Spéder 2016). The family is eligible from when the fetus 
of the child is 91 days old for as long as he or she is a dependent under tax law (OHCHR 2015). 
The deducted amount has always been for each child, and higher if the family has three or more 
children or if the child is disabled. Tax deductions for children were cancelled 1995-8, but 
restored in 2000 to their form from the early 1990s with all deductions significantly increased 
from their 1990 values (Spéder 2016), (Raț, Szikra and Inglot 2012). From 2002-10, the second 
socialist government again made only families with three or more children or who had an income 
below a certain level eligible and lowered the deduction amounts (Spéder 2016). In 2011, Fidesz 
significantly increased the deduction from the base in 2000 of 1,700 HUF a month to 10,000 
HUF, and the increase for families with three or more children went from 2600 to 33,000 HUF 
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(Raț, Szikra and Inglot 2012). In 2014, families whose monthly income was less than the 
deduction could subtract the remainder from their health and pension insurance contributions 
(családi járulék kedvezmény, “family contribution discount”), thus functioning as a tax credit 
and so more beneficial to poorer families, and from 2016 to 2019, the amount for families with 
two children was increased annually until the 2019 amount of 20,000 HUF per child was twice 
the 2016 amount (OHCHR 2015), (Vida 2019). There have been no tax credits for children 
except for mentioned lowered the liability for social insurance contributions introduced in 2014 
(Kapitány and Makay 2014).  
3.2 Labor Market Benefits 
The GYES was introduced with and has always been tied with a law forcing employers to 
allow the mother to go on leave for its duration of three years and reemploy her at the end 
(Spéder 2016). The same obligation applied for the ANYT, TGYÁS/CSED, and GYED. In 2014, 
Fidesz introduced amendments to the Labor Code, key for reconciling home with work for 
mothers. Employers became obliged to offer part-time work to their female employees upon 
childbirth from the child’s six month to third year, and its Job Protection Action Plan lowers the 
amount employers have to pay to social insurance for mothers with children under three if they 
employ them part-time (Amended: Act I of 2012 on the Labor Code), (OHCHR 2015). 
Employers began to comply in the public, then private sectors (Kapitány and Makay 2014). 
3.3 Housing and Transportation Benefits 
Three main types of housing benefits have been available for periods since 1973. First, 
low-rent government housing was made available in 1973 for families with three or more 
children. The second benefit is help with credit for housing. Subsidies paying all interest on 
loans for houses were offered from 1973 until the mid-1980s (Spéder 2016, 188). In 2012, as 
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part of the Family and Home Creation Program (Család és Otthon Kormányzati Otthonteremtési 
Program) Fidesz reintroduced subsidies covering the interest of credit or mortgages to purchase, 
construct or renovate residences, and reduced the minimum down payment for homes to 20%. In 
2014, Fidesz expanded the Family and Home Creation Program to help couples with one child or 
who promised to have a child purchase used homes too. In 2018, the government began offering 
to pay off 1 million Ft of mortgage debt for each child a family has after the second (Vida 2019). 
The third benefit type is housing grants. The first were introduced in 1973 and lasted 
until the mid-1980s, and were given to newly married couples if they promised to have a certain 
number of children, only to be returned if they did not have them (Spéder 2016). In 2012, Fidesz 
introduced new housing grants as part of the Family and Home Creation Program, called the 
social housing subsidy for couples to buy new or used housing or renovating current housing. 
Couples must be applying for a mortgage and promise to have one in four or two children in 
eight years, but do not have to already have children. The amounts range between 800,000 and 
3,250,000 HUF in 2015, and increase for the number of existing or promised children (OHCHR 
2015). In 2015, the Family Home Creation Subsidy or CSOK (Családi Otthonteremtési 
Kedvezmény) began, offering couples between 500,000 to 2.5 million Ft to buy a house varying 
by the amount of children promised (at least two) and if both partners are under forty. In 2016, 
amounts were increased from 2.6 to 10 million Ft, and taxes on the purchase of houses dropped 
from 27% to 5% (Vida 2019). 
In 2019, the government began to pay for up to 2.5 mil Ft of the price of seven-person 




3.4 Childcare and Early Education Services 
“Childcare and early education service” is an umbrella term used by international 
organizations such as OECD to categorize all institutions that offer care or education to young 
children, usually defined as up to five years in age (OECD 2016). Nurseries or creches 
(Bölcsőde) are mainly public facilities that take care of children from their 20th week usually to 
age three but in no cases after age five, that are usually open 10-12 hours a day, but most parents 
enroll them only after children two. Family day cares (Családi napközi) offer the same services 
but are privately run and offer services during holidays unlike many nurseries (OECD 2016). 
Home childcare is the third type of service for children up to three and are merely informal 
arrangements between parents. Both family day cares and home childcare are rare (Kapitány and 
Makay 2014). Kindergartens (Óvoda) are state-run and largely evenly state-financed early 
childhood education centers available from the ages of three to five (Kapitány and Makay 2014). 
10% are privately operated (OECD 2016). 
The availability and quality of nurseries has historically varied widely by region. From 
1990 to 2000, the availability of nurseries greatly decreased, and in that decade the enrollment 
rate of children 0-3 in nurseries decreased from 14% to 9% (Vida 2019, 6). Before 2010, parents 
only had to pay for their child’s meals across the country, when Fidesz made individual nurseries 
set costs for other services and local governments decide which services are subsidized 
(Kapitány and Makay 2014). However, in September 2015, the eligibility for free meals in 
family day cares and kindergartens was greatly expanded (Vida 2019). The government 
increased the availability of nurseries and family daycares, the latter through subsidies, from 
37,000 to 47,000 between 2010 and 2014 (OHCHR 2015). Day care or nursery was available to 
16.5% of children under three in 2015. From September 2015, parents must enroll their child in 
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public nursery or kindergarten from the age of three until compulsory education at age six. An 
obligation establishes an opportunity in this case, so in most cases parents can transfer the care of 
their children during the day to the state once the child turns three. Compulsory public education 









































CHAPTER 4: LITERATURE REVIEW 
We consider contributions to understanding what has affected fertility in Hungary in the 
last 30 years and note the best qualities of previous studies that we try to combine in ours as is 
possible. 
Existing empirical studies of the determinants on fertility in post-socialist Hungary can be 
divided into those that study the effects of the post-2010 family policies on fertility intentions or 
behavior, those that do not but study the effects of socioeconomic variables on individual 
fertility, and those that estimate the effect of macroeconomic indicators on aggregate fertility.  
In the first group, Sági and Lentner gathered a large sample of targeted data from 
university students in Hungary on whether they deemed housing support for couples, a key part 
of the Fidesz policy, as useful or personally motivating in having a child. However, the study did 
not measure actual fertility or gather socioeconomic covariates of participants preventing a 
multinomial regression analysis, leaving its unique data nevertheless ripe for future analysis 
(Sági and Lentner 2018). Sági and Lentner only look at the net amounts of participants or money 
spent or received of two family allowances on aggregate fertility in an informal manner (Sági 
and Lentner 2018). Zsolt Spéder and Balázs Kapitány of the Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office’s Demographic Research Institute (KSH MNK) have performed most in-depth research of 
the determinants of fertility in Hungary since the 2000s. Spéder, Murinkó and Oláh (2020) 
recently released a study estimating not just the effect of the changes of tax-credits versus 
allowances before and after 2010, but also of certain socioeconomic characteristics of individuals 
on actual fertility from a large sample. 
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In the second group, a number of papers perform regressions on the effect of individual 
socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes such as the education level of women and the 
religiosity and stated fertility intentions of individuals on accomplished fertility on data from the 
first three waves of the Turning-Points in Life survey (GGP Consortium 2018) administered 
from 2001-2009 (Kamarás and Spéder 2008), (Kapitány and Spéder 2014), (Szalma and Takács 
2015), (Kapitány and Spéder 2009), (Kapitány and Spéder 2015), (Kapitány and Spéder 2012). 
These influence our hypotheses about co-determinants of fertility. Nevertheless, they did not 
estimate the effects of pre-2010 family policies and could not look at the effect of post-2010 
changes. 
Finally, of the third group Gábos (2005) conducted an in-depth study of the effects of 
allowances and tax credits on fertility up to 2005, and the Hungarian Court of Auditors (Vida 
2019) gave an in-depth statement of family policy developments since the 1950s and compared 






















CHAPTER 5: THEORY OF CHOICE 
This study is meant to have practical implications, that is, to give knowledge that can be 
used in decision making to accomplish an end. The end we would like to accomplish is more 
births, and the agent whose decision making this study may inform would be the state, or 
secondarily some other organization, which in either case is not the same agent as the people 
whose behavior it would like to influence, a man and a woman. Since it is unjust to force either 
person in a couple to conceive a child, we are ultimately interested in influencing their choice. 
Thus, a basic understanding of the nature of choice and its effect on the world is crucial to 
understanding how any of the policies could bring about higher fertility. Some definitions will 
offer us much needed clarity for a discussion on the effectiveness of family policy. 
In general, desire is when an agent has a representation of an object in the world that tries 
to realize the object. This representation can be a concept, or a direct representation, like an 
emotion or image7. A desire does not necessarily succeed in realizing its object, and the 
prevention of the realization may occur due to another desire within the person, or external 
conditions. For example, a couple may have an emotional desire for a child, but a conceptual 
desire to not have one now since they cannot support one. But by object we really just mean a 




This representation can be of a contradiction, like people with cognitive dissonance have. This does not mean a 
contradiction itself exists: to say I want 𝑝 and ¬𝑝 is not to say 𝑞 and ¬𝑞. 
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Thus, we can specify a desire by the agent 𝑥 who has it and the state of affairs 𝑦 that they 
desire. The fact that states of affairs can be conditional, i.e. of the form that if something 
happens, another thing happens, carries the key consequence that the noticeability of the reality 
of an object of desire can happen without a change in the desire of the agent itself. For example, 
a woman may desire to have a child whenever she has part-time work promised to her. Though 
we do not think of it, when she is not working part-time she is still realizing the object of her 
desire. Later, when the woman finds part-time work and has a child, we commonly say she made 
a choice after finding work to have a child. But really she was only keeping her desideratum true 
from when she had no part-time work to when she did. She may have only started to choose the 
means necessary to have a child once her condition was met, but this does not mean that she 
changed her childbearing desire itself or its reality. 
A choice is a type of conceptual desire where the will determines itself. It is contrasted 
from other desires that are determined by external conditions, for example the arousal of instinct. 
We also call choices volitional desires. Though choices usually have the strength to prevent non-
volitional desires from realizing their object; for example the choice to restrain one’s self from 
eating too much; this is not always the case, and thus the distinction between the two is in the 
type of determining, not the power to realize its object. 
For ethical reasons we will state and justify in Chapter 6, we will concern ourselves with 
choice alone in this thesis. However, because all desire can be specified by its agent and object 
or desideratum, we can use the notation we introduce with a new predicate symbol like 𝐷 to 
indicate a desire in general, or other forms of desire. 
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A choice can be represented by a predicate in first-order logic 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝), where 𝑥 is the 
agent, and 𝑝 is a representation of the proposition 𝑥 chooses8. Some states of affairs can be 
immediately realized by the mere choice of it by 𝑥 plus certain external conditions 𝑠, which we 
will term actions for 𝑥, and some cannot, termed ends for 𝑥. A state of affairs 𝑝 is realizable for 
agent 𝑥 if there is some proposition 𝑞 that 𝑥 can choose that along with other external conditions 
𝑠 that hold are sufficient to realize 𝑝 – thus all actions are realizable, but not the converse. If 𝑝 is 
an end for 𝑥, but is either not realizable, or is realizable but 𝑥 does not choose actions that are 
sufficient to realize it, then it is a wish for 𝑥. 
By “realize” or “bring about” we mean a stronger concept than that simply of the material 
conditional of formal logic, which is true simply whenever its antecedent is false or its 
consequence is true – we mean that the antecedent produces or is the reason for the consequence 
coming to be9. Thus if 𝑝 realizes 𝑞, the material conditional 𝑝 → 𝑞 is true, but not necessarily the 
converse. We notate that 𝑝 realizes 𝑞 by 𝑝 ⟹ 𝑞. 
In general, an agent may desire something unconditionally or conditionally10. When an 
agent desires 𝑝 unconditionally, then 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝) and we say they have a simple desire for 𝑝. There 
 
8
We are committing a number of formal errors that can be cleaned up in a more formalized system. We are firstly 
using symbols for propositions as used in propositional logic in a first-order system, and second using them as 
logical constants in a first-order system. In reality, we define a bijection from all first-order formulas to the set of 
logical constants and are saying that agents 𝑥 desire or choose these constants. 
 
9
Christian Wolff (1679-1754), the first systematic philosopher to write extensively in German, calls what brings 
something about its ratio fiendi or its reason for becoming, as distinguished from our ratio cognoscendi, or the 
reason by which we know the thing to exist, in §866 of his work on ontology (First Philosophy, or Ontology 1730, 
666). If we know a material conditional to be true, we at most know that its antecendent is a ratio congnoscendi for 
its consequence, but do not thereby know the consequence’s reason for coming to be. For example, one may know 
that a baby was born by hearing his or her laugh in an adjacent room where a woman was in labor, but the ratio 
fiendi for the baby being born is obviously something else. 
 
10
It is easy to show that all logical connectives between atomic propositions in propositional logic or atomic 
predicates in first-order logic can be reduced to some combination of the connectives ¬ or → (Enderton 2001, 49). 
Thus we know then that all states of affairs that an agent chooses in desiring 𝑝 only include 𝑝, →, ¬, or some other 
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are two ways in which someone may desire something conditionally. A state of affairs 𝑞 is a 
circumstantial desire for 𝑥 with circumstantial condition 𝑝 if 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝 → 𝑞) – that is, the agent 
desires that q happen at least whenever p happens, but not necessarily otherwise. A limited desire 
𝑝 for 𝑥 with necessary or limiting condition q likewise is when 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝 → 𝑞) – here, the focus is 
on the antecedent of the conditional statement being chosen. A desire is conditional if it is 
circumstantial or limited, and a condition is either a circumstantial or limiting condition. Thus, 
our woman desiring part-time work while childrearing circumstantially chooses childbearing. 
Note also that she is merely desiring the material conditional of logic and not that her having a 
part-time job in reality cause her to have a child – this is the advantage of the reductive definition 
of the material conditional, it describes the essence of all implication11. 
It is not always the case that someone chooses the condition of their conditional desires. 
For example, a woman may only desire to have a child once she has reached a obtained a certain 
position in the workplace, but this does not mean she makes getting this vocational position a 
goal for her actions. Likewise, a man may circumstantially desire to have a child whenever he 
feels his family’s earnings are enough to support one, but this does not mean he has the goal of 
making enough at work. This motivates our following definitions. 
A circumstantial desire q is reluctant for x if 𝐶(𝑥, ¬𝑝) and ¬𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝) where 𝑝 is its 
relevant condition. This captures the phenomenon of doing something only because of 
circumstances that are themselves undesired. For example, a woman may choose to reenter the 
 
propositions 𝑞1, … , 𝑞𝑛. But of all these, only the three forms given – the merely categorical 𝑝 or a conditional 
statement where 𝑝 is the antecedent or consequence – are what we mean when we say someone desires 𝑝, because 
otherwise we would want some complicated situation where p only plays a role, but is not assured given whatever 
conditions for 𝑝 might be met, e.g. “if when I have a child, then I also have part-time work; then I will be able to 
afford to only work part-time” does not express that the person wants a child under certain conditions, but only that 
they desire that working-part time be affordable under certain conditions. 
 
11
That is, 𝑝 → 𝑞 is true if and only if ¬𝑝 or 𝑞. 
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workforce while nursing a young child when her family does not have enough to support itself, 
but before, she either actively tried to stop her family’s finances from becoming insufficient, or 
at least did not choose that they become so small. A circumstantial desire 𝑞 with relevant 
condition 𝑝 for 𝑥 is ideal if 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝) and ¬𝐶(𝑥, ¬𝑝). Thus if a woman wants to have a child when 
she can work part-time from when the child is six-months old, but also desires such a part-time 
job (and possibly seeks it), then her having a child is ideal to her in the sense that she is also 
happy with the circumstances in which he would be born. There are only two other logically 
possible types of circumstantial choices, the simple deduction of which can be seen in the tree 
diagram of Figure 4. We term these indifferent when the agent neither chooses the circumstantial 
condition or its opposite, and simply that the agent chooses a contradiction when they choose 
both the circumstantial condition and its opposite. 
Because any implication tautologically implies its contrapositive, i.e. 𝑝 → 𝑞 if and only if 
¬𝑞 → ¬𝑝, any conditional desire for something 𝑝 is also a conditional desire for its negation12. 
Thus, it is important to note that the contradictory ¬𝑞 of any circumstantial desire 𝑞 is a limited 
desire, and so if we take it that whenever someone desires 𝑝 → 𝑞 and 𝑝 that they also desire 𝑞, 
then any ideal desire occasions a reluctant circumstantial desire for ¬𝑝. That is, whenever our 
 
12
We offer ourselves this axiom assumed in saying the choice of the contrapositive follows from the choice of a 
conditional: that if a set of propositions that an agent chooses either in one choice or across choices tautologically 
imply another proposition, i.e., in all truth-value assignments to the components, then they choose this consequence. 
Note we do not say the same thing for all logical consequence, due to the awkwardness of the material conditional 
already mentioned: as long as the consequence of a material condition is true, the material conditional is true. Thus, 
if an agent chose to have a child and it so happens that it is raining, then the material conditional, “if one has a child, 
it is raining”, is true and thus by implication the agent would choose that it rain. This is not absurd because the 
consequence is not always true whenever the antecedent is: if we limited the consequence to saying that “it rained at 
this time”, then it is always true that it rained at that time, and so any material conditional with it as its consequence 
is always true. It is absurd because it does not follow that it is raining when one has a child when it is not raining, 
even though it “follows” (according to the material conditional) when it is raining. That is, the conditional does not 
hold in all possible assignments of truth-values to its components, “one has a child” and “it is raining”. Even if the 
material conditional happens to always be true when we assume by the uncertain metaphysical argument that “it is 
raining at this time” is always true, this material conditional is still not a tautology, and so our axiom ensures that an 
agent only chooses the necessary, and usually apparent, consequences of his or her original choice. 
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woman ideally wants to have a child when she has flexible part-time work, then she reluctantly 
desires to not have such a job when she does not have a child, because really, she would like the 
child. It may seem odd to say she does not want such a job offered to her when she does not have 
a child, but this is due to language – it is not that our woman singularly desires to not have the 
job, but that she would not like to miss the opportunity of having a child under such flexible 
employment – this is the logical equivalent to saying she would like a child when she has such 
work by contrapositive. 
The state of affairs 𝑞 is a negative motive for 𝑝 and 𝑥 if either 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝 → (𝑝 →  ¬𝑞)) or 
𝐶(𝑥, (𝑝 →  ¬𝑞) → 𝑝), and 𝑞 is a positive motive for 𝑝 and 𝑥 if either 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝 → (𝑝 → 𝑞)) or 
𝐶(𝑥, (𝑝 → 𝑞) → 𝑝). For example, a woman in socialist Hungary may have had the negative 
motive to have a child because doing so formed a stronger private life that was free from the 
intrusions of the state (Kamarás and Spéder 2008), or she may have chosen to have a child for 
the positive motive of receiving approval of her circle of friends and family in the culture of 
Hungary with a large expectation that adults become parents (Szalma and Takács 2015). 
We say 𝑥 chooses p as a means for, for the sake of, or for the end of q if for some 
external conditions 𝑠 that do not necessarily hold, 𝐶(𝑥, (𝑝 ∧ 𝑠 ⇒ 𝑞) → 𝑝), where “⟹” again 
means to bring about or realize. This distinguishes the case when an agent intentionally chooses 
something as a means to an end as opposed to haphazardly choosing something that brings about 
that end, which can happen even if independently the agent chooses an end: imagine, for 
example, someone wishing to have a desirable job but not seeking one, but then meeting 
someone who unexpectedly offers them a desirable job in casual conversation. The condition that 
the means produce the end is only sufficient or circumstantial, because we can still choose what 
happens to be a means for a certain end even when it ceases to be a means for it, while still 
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assuring that we will choose it whenever it produces the desired end. Finally, the condition s 
does not necessarily hold, because we can still hypothetically choose certain means even when 
the conditions in the outside world also needed to produce our end do not hold. For example, a 
woman can choose that her marital relations with a desirable man be the means of her having 
children even when she has not found such a man in her daily life. One can choose their own 
choice as a means for something, and we will see in Chapter 6 that this is constitutive of consent 
in the case of childbearing13. 
We say that 𝑥 intends 𝑝 if for all 𝑞 that 𝑥 chooses, 𝑥 intends 𝑞 as a means for 𝑝14. This 
means that nothing the agent chooses ever haphazardly realizes the end under consideration, but 
not necessarily that everything that the agent chooses really be able to realize the end in question. 
Note merely volitionally choosing 𝑝 does not mean that someone intends it in the intuitive sense, 
hence our additional definition – a couple may be genuinely planning to have a child, but not 
intend that a current session of coitus be the means for having one. 
We call 𝑥’s desire for 𝑝 cultural or unconditional if 𝑥 either desires 𝑝 simply or ideally 
circumstantially if conditional15. The culture of a society is its set of values, practices and objects 
that it respects, creates or maintains for their aesthetic or moral purpose, which are hence 
 
13
When an agent’s choice is the means to an end, we would change the main part of the definition to 
𝐶(𝑥, (𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝) ∧ 𝑠 ⟹ 𝑞) → 𝑝). When 𝑝 is realizable by the agent, then the two definitions are almost equivalent, 
because then some action of theirs realizes 𝑝 along with some external conditions, which we may as well reduce to 
𝑝. Then, 𝑥 would equally choose 𝑝 whenever just 𝑝 or its choice of 𝑝 realized 𝑞 through external conditions, because 
in the first case 𝑝 could be immediately be realized by their choice. Finally, in some cases it could be the case that 
the choice that something be a means for an end itself realize the end if the means do indeed realize the end, i.e., 
more generally that 𝑟 → 𝑝 realize 𝑞 if 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑝) does, because the agent would simply realize the means whenever it 
perceives 𝑟. Of course, we cannot universally assume this, because the agent may always fail to perceive 𝑟 whenever 
it really happens, but the assumption usually holds because we can accurately perceive most of the kinds of 
conditions we give ourselves. 
 
14
Except when 𝑞 is of the form of a choice of a means for 𝑝 itself, to prevent infinite regress. 
 
15
This definition is inspired by the neo-Kantian tradition of Ernst Cassirer (Cassirer 2000). 
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unconditional, or chosen only under insignificant limiting conditions. For example, regardless of 
her financial ability to raise a child and even stay home with him or her, a woman may choose to 
not have a child for the perceived fulfillment of work that is prohibitive of having a child in her 
mind. We term a desire instrumental or pragmatic if it is not cultural. This definition is 
significant, for if a woman culturally does not desire to have a child, then no matter the 
incentives offered to her through policy to have one, this decision is likely to end in not having a 
child due to her opposition or indifference to the conditions of childbearing. 





















CHAPTER 6: HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, we firstly give three ethical criteria to determine if the types of plausible 
causal links between Fidesz family policy and fertility are themselves states of affairs that are 
just, because if we do indeed find a positive effect on childbirth, we want to be able to 
recommend similar policies to maintain or achieve fertility. Second, assuming these ethical 
conditions we divide the types of people whom the policies can influence to have children by the 
types of childbearing choices they have and hypothesize an increase of fertility according to the 
conditional childbearing choices prevalent in Hungary today. Third, we consider the effect of 
socioeconomic and cultural factors on fertility informed by recent empirical studies of 
childbearing behaviors in Hungary.  
We hypothesize a modest increase of fertility with a positive perception of household 
income, being married, having ever lived with a partner, valuing tradition, being Catholic, and 
being Catholic while attending a service at least monthly. Conversely, we predict individuals to 
have fewer children the more they value fun and pleasure in life and the older they think the 
maximum age for a woman to consider having a child is. We hypothesize that a woman will have 
fewer children the higher her education level or the more hours she worked at a job held while 
making the decision to have or not have a child. 
6.1 Determination of Causal Links of Interest 
Family policy can increase fertility in accordance with the consent of and through the 
choice of mothers and fathers, or through physically or psychologically coercing them. The 
socialist government of Hungary artificially decreased male wages in order to force women into 
the workforce and into what were mostly only full-time jobs, thereby decreasing birth rates, for 
example (Spéder 2016, 178). However, we are interested in whether the Fidesz family policies 
ethically increased birth rates, in order to make our results applicable to decision-making, and so 
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we only admit a hypothesis if it predicts that the policies along with the choice of potential 
parents affected births. 
Precisely put, this means three things: (i) that the policies realized childbearing or its 
absence in a way that did not contradict the childbearing choices of parents, or their conditional 
or simple choices to have or not have a child, (ii) that certain choices of potential parents were 
part of what caused their resultant childbearing behavior, and (iii) that they intended these 
effective choices to be the means of their childbearing desires. It is ethically necessary that 
potential parents’ choices and not only desires be what are respected and what cause their 
resultant childbearing behavior, since a choice is what a person intends, or how they determine 
themself, whereas other sorts of desires can merely arise naturally and not express what the 
person finally tries to realize. Tangentially, it is quite common for a person to have conflicting 
non-volitional desires that cannot all be realized. 
It is necessary that (iii) hold because otherwise the state would be coercing potential 
parents in the way they bring about their desires, even if it respected their desired goals. For 
example, even if a couple desires a child in the near future and having one at the nearest 
opportunity does not contradict this goal, this does not mean the couple desires that a pregnancy 
result from their next voluntary coition, and so although e.g. the state issuing them defective 
contraceptives would still respect (i) and (ii), it would not respect the couple’s choice on the 
means to their goal. 
 We are not interested in the particular means that bring about people’s childbearing 
desires, but only if the policies caused more births through the choice of parents in a way that did 
not contradict their childbearing desires and that they intended this choice to be a means. Thus 
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we are interested if the policies resulted in realizing people’s childbearing desires when they 
include the birth of a new child.  
Here, a childbearing choice, desire or goal is a choice to have or not have a child, which 
according to our analysis is either simple, circumstantial, or limited. The fourth remaining group 
of potential parents upon whom the policy works are those without a childbearing desire. These 
four groups comprise all logical possibilities assuming (i) to (iii). From our analysis we know 
that any conditional choice to not have a child is also a conditional choice to have a child, and so 
we only need to consider the effect of policies on potential parents with circumstantial, limited, 
and simple choices to have a child, the simple choice to not have a child, and those with no 
desires on the matter.  
Note the choice to have a child in a particular way, such as by ensuring intervals between 
births, or postponing childbirth until certain life events are accomplished, reduce to conditional 
choices in our theory of desire. A childbearing desire is simply the choice to father or give birth 
to a child who survives childbirth simpliciter, if certain conditions hold (circumstantial), or only 
if certain conditions hold (limited), or independent of any conditions (simple). To hypothesize 
the singular effect of the Fidesz policies on births in Hungary, we must consider whether a 
person has a child or not when all other conditions are held constant, and hence on a person 
starting with the absence of or the same childbearing desire with and without the policy. Thus if 
all the choices we assume from (ii) combined with other conditions cause the same effect with or 
without the policy, we hypothesize no effect on fertility. This of course does not mean that one 
of the effects of the policies could not be the change of one’s childbearing desires. However, we 
will also show that what is commonly called a “change” in desire is really only the same desire 
becoming realized in a more noticeable way. 
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To admit a hypothesis, given ethical constraints (i) to (iii) and practical constraints, we can see 
we only consider the case when an individual intends that one of their choices realizes their 
childbearing desire and that this choice itself does realize their childbearing desire. The two 
cases in which this is satisfied are circled in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: The ways a choice can realize something 
 
 
6.2 The Effect of Fidesz Family Policy on Fertility 
We do not hypothesize a negative effect on childbearing through the simple choice to not 
have a child. The policies did not prevent or help the realization of the strictly minimal biological 
conditions for having a child. A person with a simple choice to have a child would realize this 
desire through the same minimal mechanisms with or without the policy: a potent man would 
need a fertile woman, and a fertile woman would need at the least the sperm of another man for 
in-vitro fertilization, the pregnancy would have to be healthy, and all parties involved would 
have to consent. Since the Fidesz policies up to 2018 did not help make people more biologically 
capable of childbearing, find other people willing and able to have a child, or support artificial 
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fertilization16, we hypothesize no difference on the fertility outcomes of people with simple 
choices to have a child either. This is only counterintuitive if we do not distinguish a simple from 
conditional choice – it means the person gives themself no conditions for having children, and 
since strictly speaking, successfully having a child is possible regardless of many things like 
sufficient income or job stability that people make as conditions, and because the policies do not 
help realize the strict determinants of childbearing, there is no special effect on people who 
would have a child no matter the world around them. 
Instead, we expect that the way in which Fidesz’s policies would work to increase 
fertility is through overcoming circumstantial or limited conditions people give themselves for 
having children. This characterization of the impact of family policy on fertility has been 
suggested by prior research in Hungary and across Europe (Sági and Lentner 2018), (Spéder 
2016). Fidesz family policy provides increased financial support, favorable labor conditions, 
childcare provisions, and some housing and transportation benefits to make childrearing more 
desirable. We are thus truly hypothesizing that the interaction between the policies and certain 
types of conditional childbearing desires are what cause fertility, but we also hypothesize that the 
types of conditional choices that the policies realize fertility through have been prevalent before 
and after the policy changes, so that in the current context we should see fertility increase merely 
after the implementation of the policies. This is strengthened by the fact that people with the 
types of conditional choices through which we do not hypothesize the policy will cause higher 
fertility do not in turn have a negative effect on childbearing, and so there is no mitigating effect 
 
16
The state purchased six in-vitro fertilization clinics in 2020 to offer free IVF treatment to couples, after the time 
we are studying (BBC 2020). 
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on fertility from this remnant of people17. We will see later how we lack direct data on 
conditional childbearing desires and so omit the interaction term and merely test for the policy in 
our models. 
A major condition that women have been concerned with in the West and Hungary since 
the 1960s is the particular composition of activity between the home and extra-domestic activity 
in the life of a woman with young children, which we call her “work/home life” (Spéder 2016). 
Despite reason to think school and work have a differential effect on childbearing due to partial 
confirmation for Hungary in the 2000s by Spéder and Bartus and throughout the West since the 
late 20th century generally (2017), the policies offer support to reconcile school and not just work 
with childrearing, so we group school and other extra-domestic activities into the moniker 
“work” here. We only consider women’s desired makeup of domestic and extra-domestic 
activity for when their child is under three, since after a child turns three there is less of a social 
expectation in Hungary for mothers to personally care for the child, and children from the age of 
five have been offered free or affordable preschools or schooling for decades in Hungary 
(Kapitány and Makay 2014). 
There are two components to work/home life childbearing desires. The first is the 
conditional desire itself, that only states what work/home life a person thinks qualifies or 
disqualifies a woman from having a child. The second only exists if the conditional choice is 
ideal – it is the choice between a competing home/work life dynamic or having a child in the 
 
17
For example, the fact that the policies make part-time work more available to women with young children does 
not mean they will discourage childbearing for those who previously desired to work full-time or stay at home while 
childrearing, because the policies do not make finding full-time work or the possibility of staying home any more 
difficult on their own. 
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case of a conflict, or of the circumstantial condition to having or not having a child. If only the 
first exists, the person is indifferent, as demonstrated in our theory of desire.18 
Both desires have always existed, but over the 20th century women have progressively 
given themselves more demanding work/home life conditions, who we divide into three 
categories according to the type of their chosen condition in addition to the traditional category 
of women who prefer to always be at home with their child (Spéder 2016, 179). Our first group 
is women with the traditional circumstantial or limiting condition to not work at all while 
childbearing. The second is women who prefer to not work or only work part-time while having 
a child under three. The third group is women who choose to have a child if, or only if, they can 
work part-time while the child is under three. The fourth group is composed of women who have 
the circumstantial or limiting condition to work part or full time, or only full time while with 
young children19. In general, because it is harder to find part-time work than no work in 
Hungary, the third group of women who demand part-time work has had fewer children, and 
those in the fourth group doubly have had the problem of finding affordable early childhood care 
centers or any at all (Kapitány and Spéder 2012), (Kapitány and Makay 2014). 
 
18
That is, if 𝑥 is the potential parent, 𝐶 is giving birth to or father a live child, and 𝑊 is a work-home life 
composition however restrictive, then 𝐶(𝑥, 𝑊 →  𝐶) or, 𝐶(𝑥, 𝐶 → 𝑊) ↔ 𝐶(𝑥, ¬𝑊 → ¬𝐶), and so if the first is 
ideal, the parent chooses the home/work life and to have a child, but if the third is ideal, he or she chooses the 
opposite work/home life and to not have a child. If the parent does not choose the circumstantial condition of having 
or not having a child, then they do not care if their situation eventually leads to having or not having a child, termed 
indifferent. We do not consider the other two cases of choosing a contradiction or a reluctant choice to have or not 
have a child as part of a work/home life childbearing desire, because they do not allow us to determine whether the 
person chooses childbearing or a certain work/home life in conflict. 
 
19
Of course, the other two logically possible work/home life conditions exist of no work or full-time work and 
anything; but the first is uncommon and the second is a tautology (work or no work) and thus reduces the purported 
conditional choice to a simple choice to have a child, previously considered. In general, the number of logically 
consistent combinations of an exhaustive set of 𝑛 mutually-exclusive propositions is 2𝑛 − 1, as each can either be 
affirmed or negated in the combination, only their disjunctions and not conjunctions are consistent, and the case 
where all are denied is ruled out by exhaustivity. 
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The second component of a work/home life conditional childbearing choice is the choice 
between the work/home life favorable for childbearing or its opposite unfavorable to it. Women 
have not started to choose working in a way prohibitive to childbearing for themselves in large 
numbers, but instead the members of the third group have found it difficult to find part-time 
work, and those of the fourth group who accept full-time work as an alternative to part-time 
work have not been able to put their children in early childhood care centers20. Thus even if 
these women’s conditional childbearing choices are ideal and they choose to find part-time work 
or an institution to care for their child during work, circumstances outside their control are 
preventing them from having children21. The women in the first group who see a conflict 
between any extra-domestic activity and caring for a child under three have traditionally chosen 
to not be engaged in extra-domestic activity and thus have children regardless of job availability 
(Spéder 2016).  
We expect the policies to modestly increase fertility among women with the home/work 
life conditions of the second through fourth groups, because they have expanded provisions for 
childcare whether the mother wants to take care of her child minimally or maximally: the 
expansion of early childcare centers allow more women to work full-time even before the child 
is three if this is their condition for childbearing, and the expansion of the availability of part-
time work and allowances and tax deductions allow more women to spend more or all of their 
 
20
Of course, a person may simply choose a certain work/home life regardless of whether they see it as conflicting 
with having a child or not and then choose to not have a child, but then this choice to not have a child is either simple, 
or conditional with a different condition, both of which we have already considered. 
 
21
That is, if 𝑃 is having part-time work, and 𝐶 is having a child, the restrictiveness of modern choices on 
childbearing arises from the fact that our woman chooses 𝐶 → 𝑃 or 𝑃 → 𝐶, not that she chooses ¬𝑃. She may even 
choose 𝑃. Of course, some women do choose full-time work even when it is prohibitive of childbearing for them, 
but the literature does not imply that this is a large phenomenon. 
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time at home, respectively. We expect this positive effect to be mitigated by women whose 
conditions were not met because of lack of access to childcare centers, or part-time work for 
those not previously employed, and whose income was still low enough to force them into work; 
and by those who had other unmet conditions, or those with merely limiting work/home life 
conditions22, or those who did not try to realize their conditional choices. 
The second type of condition that the policies meet is income threshold and the 
possession of final goods, through the increase in allowances and tax deductions, and support to 
get a house or car. Because we hypothesize a modest increase of fertility with household income, 
which we support later, and because an increase in income makes it easier for a mother to stay at 
home, thus working through home/work life conditional childbearing choices23, we expect an 
increase in fertility from the policy for people who desire children conditioned by a level of 
income and possession of final goods.  
To see how policies help couples overcome the perceived work/home conflict and 
economic lack, we will walk through the life of a mother with a young child in the cases when 
she is previously employed, or in school, or neither. A woman previously employed and 
possessing health insurance for at least two years before her child’s birth first gets the 
TGYÁS/CSED for six months, then the GYED. The TGYÁS/CSED has no maximum limit, but 
the GYED does. The TGYÁS/CSED and GYED have long been 70% of the mother’s prior 
 
22
This is because these are not sufficient conditions, which we call circumstantial. That is, if a woman chooses and 
realizes 𝐶 → 𝑊, 𝑊 does not ensure 𝐶. 
 
23
That is, if 𝐼 is household income below a certain threshold, 𝑊 is a composition of domestic and work activity, and 
𝐶 is having a child, then the mother chooses to go to work if her household needs the income, or 𝐼 →  𝑊, and also 
wills 𝑊 →  ¬𝐶, and so when the allowances and tax benefits produce ¬𝐼 they thus eliminate a reason for not having 
a child. If the woman is in one of the second to fourth groups, then the income and final goods effect of the policies 
do not help or hinder childbearing through her work/home life conditions since women who prefer to work at least 
some while raising a young child do not avoid work when their household income is high enough from other sources; 
instead they still choose to work for other cultural motives, e.g. self-fulfillment. 
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income, but the cap to the GYED was increased 43% in absolute terms since 2010 (OHCHR 
2015). The GYED has always been offered for two years and secured the employment of 
mothers for that long, but only in 2014 could women start working while receiving the GYED, 
then after the child’s first year, and in 2016 for the entire duration of reception of the GYED, 
allowing reentry to the workforce immediately after TGYÁS/CSED-funded maternal leave. A 
previously employed women can then receive the lower amounted GYES until the child turns 
three, even while working, though this provision has not changed since 2004. For this whole 
time, she in most cases always has the option to work at her previous employer part-time, due to 
the 2014 amendments to the Labor Code obliging and facilitating employers to offer their 
standing female employees part-time work six months after childbirth.  
Women who were at a university for at least two semesters prior to childbirth have 
benefitted from the generous Degree GYED introduced in 2014, available for the child’s first 
year for the period we are studying24. Women not previously employed receive the ANYT for 
the first six months, then GYES until the child is three, and benefit from the increased 
availability of part-time work due to the subsidies for employers to offer part-time work to 
mothers of young children in 2014. The continuous increase of tax deduction amounts since 
2010, and the ability to subtract leftover amounts of the taxable income base from social 
insurance contributions since 2013 for as long as the child is dependent have also helped women 
in each of these categories. 
Once children turn three, since September 2015 they must be enrolled in kindergarten or 
daycare, so mothers can freely work full-time and not worry about the end of income from the 
GYES. This has been facilitated by the increase in state-funded kindergartens and nurseries. 
 
24
Our period is up to 2018. In 2018, the state began offering the Degree GYED until the child turns two. 
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Therefore, we should see that allowance and tax benefit system increased fertility among women 
with the first and second type of work/home life conditional childbearing desires from 2014 
onwards, and that this and the labor laws and expansion of childcare centers modestly increased 
fertility among women with all kinds of work/home life conditions. 
 Finally, it can be asked if the policies not only realized childbearing through childbearing 
desires that remained the same post-ante, but if they changed childbearing desires to less-
restrictive conditional or simple desires for having a child. Though the Fidesz government has 
tried to inspire such a cultural change through enshrining the family as the basic unit of society 
and deserving of state support in the new Fundamental Law of 2011, or through hosting the 
World Conference of Families in Budapest in 2017, we do not expect these efforts to realize 
childbearing through inspiring the change to less restrictive childbearing choices.  
Colloquially, we say that when conditions become favorable for doing something, they 
make a person choose to do the thing. But what makes these conditions “favorable” for the 
performance of the physical action is itself determined by the individual, and the person would 
have said that they would perform the action if these conditions were met before ever doing it, so 
the conditions do not bring about the choice, but the choice determines what conditions bring 
about the action.25 The person was in reality choosing a conditional state of affairs where if these 
 
25
This still holds in most cases even if one is a determinist, i.e., professes that choice itself can be sufficiently caused 
by something other than an act of the subject. For if one plays tennis whenever it is sunny, then it is not the sunny 
weather that somehow biochemically caused the person to choose to play tennis or its absence that allowed him to 
stay indoors. Rather, the person chose to play tennis whenever it was sunny, and this choice caused him to play 
when it was sunny just as much as it allowed him to stay indoors when not; and this choice in turn was determined 
biochemically or however else the determinist conceives of extra-volitional causes of choice. The determinist thus 
changes the meaning of “choice” from a self-determined conception of an object that attempts to realize the object to 
a mere internal conception, i.e., a non-volitional desire in our theory. Note one is not a determinist if they merely 
state that something other than the self-determination of the subject causes a choice simpliciter, if “cause” means 
merely one part of a series of conditions that together form a minimal sufficient condition (Mackie 1965); as this 
condition outside the will could merely be a necessary condition such as divine grace in some schools of theology, 
which does not itself bring about the choice but enables it. 
 
 41 
ambient conditions were met, then the physical action would result. Thus, if for a potential parent 
having a child was always attendant upon the types of conditions we discuss, like having a house 
or a job, and he or she finally has a child when he or she has these things, what is changing is not 
the choice but the way in which it is realized. Before, the potential parent had no children 
because he or she didn’t have a car, now he or she has both. People’s choices of things do of 
course change – but we do not think that people’s choices to have children changed due to Fidesz 
policy. 
6.3 Socioeconomic and Cultural Determinants 
The relationship between income and fertility in the modern West is complex. Becker’s 
classic microeconomic analysis states that fertility decreases from the lowest earners to the 
middle-range earners, but that amongst high-income earners, fertility increases with income 
(Becker 1960). He hypothesized that most people across the income spectrum have the same 
desired amount of children. The poorest have the least knowledge and access to contraception 
and so forego paying the psychic opportunity cost of abstinence, so the poorest may have even 
more children than they desire. The richer generally have higher expenditures for their children 
because they desire children of a higher quality or utility, of course while respecting their 
humanity, but especially high wealth overcomes these higher expenditures.26 
 
26
Becker’s analysis held up for the contemporary US despite Bernard Okun’s objections that the children of rich 
parents receive the leftovers of the more expensive things that rich parents already buy as “the children of Park 
Avenue parents do not live on the Lower East Side” and that higher quality children do not require more money, as 
“a book may prove more edifying than ballet lessons” (my paraphrase) (Becker 1960, 28-33) Even if the children are 
receiving products of the same kind as their parents, and these cost more because their parents buy nicer things in 
general, the parents are still spending more by buying a higher quantity of nice things; and rich parents decide to 
invest given what they perceive will make their children higher quality, and it is commonly perceived that children 
require more money to be more talented – a rich parent would likely be ashamed to only buy their child a book even 
if he or she became a genius, both to make him or her more talented and for how it reflects on them. 
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In Hungary today, the especially high fertility of the poorest should be mitigated by the 
wide knowledge and availability of contraception, promoted under socialism (Andorka, et al. 
1999, 58), and far fewer children being necessary producer goods, accomplished throughout 
socialism with industrialization, job security, and wage and price setting. Past research hints that 
higher income of the father and thus most households still implies greater fertility in Hungary, 
especially if the father is additionally financially optimistic for the future (Kapitány and Spéder 
2009, 7, 18). We expect the increase with income to be mitigated by higher expenditures for 
children of richer parents, as well as the newer phenomenon of the desire for fewer children or 
fewer people taking steps to realize their childbearing desires (Kapitány and Spéder 2012). We 
thus hypothesize a modest increase of fertility as household income increases. We expect the 
same modest increase of fertility also when the difference between household income and 
expenditures increases, because a higher income does not necessarily pay for enough household 
expenses to encourage childbearing. Likewise, we hypothesize the same increase of fertility 
when one merely perceives household income to be higher or to meet or exceed household 
expenses more. 
We expect the fertility of women with higher levels of education to be lower, because we 
infer that they seek fulfillment in activity outside the home, and thus either require part-time 
work while childrearing, or choose full-time work while childrearing, where the first condition is 
hard to meet, and the latter in turn implies the difficultly met demand for access early childhood 
care centers. Additionally, Spéder and Bartus showed that Hungarian women with secondary 
education had fewer children for whatever additional reasons we do not hypothesize (2017). For 
the same reason, we infer that the more hours a woman worked at her job during the period in 
which she was deciding to have a child will predict having fewer children in any period of time. 
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Szalma and Takács showed that Hungarians who merely profess socially conservative 
beliefs on childbearing and rearing do not necessarily have more children, but that the immediate 
determinants of childbearing like living with a partner matters more (2015), and Hubert (2015) 
showed that greater religiosity or involvement in one’s religion often implied greater fertility in 
Hungary and other European countries. For both fathers and mothers, we therefore hypothesize 
that individuals who value religious and familial tradition more in life as well as those who 
simply profess being Roman Catholic will have modestly more children, the increase being 
mitigated without demonstration of the practice of socially conservative beliefs or fundaments of 
childbearing. However, we infer that people who not only identify as Catholic, as a large 
percentage of Central Europeans do, but the devoutly Catholic who attend services at least 
monthly, will likely be more obedient to the Church’s teachings against contraception and 
abortion, and welcoming to new life and its responsibilities, and thus have more children than if 
they merely profess such beliefs (Holy See 2014). Individuals who think that women can wait 
longer in life to consider having a child should have fewer children, because it likely implies 
they are comfortable waiting themselves until their opportunity to realize their childbearing 
intentions diminishes (Kapitány and Spéder 2009).  
We likewise predict that people who accept having a child later in life will have fewer 
children, because in Hungary and Slovakia, what was first postponement ending with two 
children in a lifetime has grown into having one child or childlessness (Spéder 2016), (Šprocha 
2019)27. We infer that someone who values seeking fun and pleasure in life will have fewer 
 
27
Although it is likely also the case that people who had their first child later themselves had fewer children, 
because the age at first childbirth or fatherhood is immanent to the phenomenon of number of births, a linear or 
Poisson regression with number of children as the outcome and age at first childbirth as a regressor would be trivial, 
and so we do not make this hypothesis explicitly – though a censored model for zero cases and a Poisson for non-
zero cases would be fitting. 
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children, because of their unwillingness to take on the struggles of raising a child, even if by the 
same token such a woman may not seek fulfillment in her career due to the exertion it involves. 
We hypothesize all these effects to take place throughout the Central and Eastern European 
countries we look at, since either the same psychological inferences can be made or 
macroeconomic and social phenomena comparable to those in Hungary took hold in them. 
Thus, from our chosen socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, we infer a type of 
childbearing choice that itself implies greater likelihood of the behavior or physical event of 
having a child, whereas we infer that the policies alongside certain types of childbearing choices 
together cause fertility. Because we are not technically inferring an interaction effect from the 
socioeconomic and cultural variables with choice types, there is no interaction of which to 
discuss the mechanisms or statistical testing. 
We especially infer an increase in fertility due to the policies in Hungary after 2014, 
because this is when provisions significantly reconciled childrearing with work in the life of a 
mother. We applied the theory of choice to first determine that we are only interested in if the 
policy caused childbearing through ethically respecting the childbearing choices of potential 
parents, this meaning that their conditions for childbearing were not contradicted, that the 
individual’s choice was part of what caused having a child, and that the individual intended these 
choices to result in having a child. We applied the theory of choice to determine the effect of 
policy on potential parents with all different forms of childbearing choices, which we 
complemented with empirical results on the major types of content of childbearing choices in 
Hungary today: the conditions people give themselves on having a child. Finally, as opposed to 
inferring the mere presence of a conflict between the life situation of an individual and their 
having or raising a child from their socioeconomic and cultural characteristics, we instead infer 
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the presence of a type of childbearing choice that indicates that the individual perceives their 
situation to be creating a conflict. If we find confirmation that more modern conditions for 
childbearing are in large part responsible for low fertility, then the economic instruments of 









































CHAPTER 7: DATA AND SAMPLE 
7.1 The European Social Survey 
Our study evaluates data from the European Social Survey, a longitudinal survey of a 
large constant set and some rotating sets of social, economic, demographic questions 
administered to fresh random samples of a varying set of European countries every two years 
since 2002 (European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure Consortium 2018). The 
units of the ESS are households, and one respondent answers all questions, the majority of which 
pertain to the respondent while some others pertain to all or some of the other inhabitants of the 
household. Though the survey does not require that the respondent be the head of the household, 
we infer that the respondent is the head. In each round, interviews were conducted in the 
namesake year and one year after for all rounds except for rounds 2, 4, 5 and 9, which were 
conducted into the third year after the namesake year. 
7.2 Measures of Fertility 
The ESS was not primarily designed to measure the biological phenomena of 
demography, like the mortality of members of a household, number of children fathered or given 
birth to of members, or the blood relations of members of the family, but offers a rich set of 
variables on social, economic and cultural characteristics and attitudes of the household and its 
head from which we can derive approximants of biological fertility. 
The age and gender of all members of the household were available for all round years, 
so we developed two binomial variables: one identifying if a child of age one or less lives in and 
thus was “added” to the household, and another stating if a child of age one or less lives in the 
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household along with another child, or if a one year old or younger was additionally added. 
Since age is defined as the number of whole years a person has lived, we will also identify these 
outcomes as “if a child born in the last two years was added to the household” and “if an 
additional child born in the last two years was added to the household”, respectively; assuming 
“in” exclusively. We will also simply refer to these variables as if the household added or added 
an additional child, respectively, assuming the age of the child added. 
The ESS does not tell us the biological relation of any of the members of the household 
to each other, since it defines descent to include biological descent, adoption, foster parenthood, 
or step relations without distinction. Since all we know is if a child was born in a time period 
where their conception could be the effect of policies and was added to the household, the units 
for the analysis of this outcome is households. 
For two rounds, 2006 and 2018, the ESS asked participants the rotating set of questions 
on biological and attitudinal demographic phenomena, called the “Timing of Life” module 
(European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure Consortium 2018). On this, it asked 
the number of children the respondent had fathered or given birth to alive in his or her lifetime. 
We use this variable as a count variable in our second model and call it simply “number of 
children” for short. To eliminate the error of counting the same child between different 
households when we admit both male and female respondents because a man in one house may 
be the father of the child of a woman in another, we only consider the number of children of 
women. Because the questions from the Timing of Life module were only asked about the 




7.3 Explanatory Variables and Samples of Analysis 
We developed a set of independent variables from the ESS raw data to test our 
hypotheses. The age of the respondent allows us to test our hypotheses of the moderate decrease 
of short-term fertility and increase of net fertility with age. We created variables for the gender 
of the respondent and whether they were married at the time of the interview for all years, and 
whether the respondent had ever lived with a partner for round years 2006 and 2018. The latter 
two test if people in a relationship have more children. 
The perception of household income is a four-value ordinal variable describing the 
respondent’s perception of how comfortably the household lives on its income, from very 
difficult to comfortable. Because this variable states not just the real or perceived income in 
absolute terms but how easily the household can live off of it, it tests our hypothesis that the 
perception of a higher difference between income and expenditures implies modestly more 
childbirths. We test if income brings up fertility slightly in both the households and individual 
analyses with perception of household income. The respondent’s educational level is given on a 
five-level EISCED scale, with less than secondary, lower secondary, upper secondary, post-
secondary non-tertiary including vocational, and tertiary education as values. For the analysis of 
women, we test our hypotheses on female employment and educational level using these 
variables, since then women are the respondents. The hours of work at last job are for the job the 
respondent last had, no matter how long ago. 
To test the hypotheses that socially conservative attitudes and behavior imply more 
children through less restrictive childbearing desires, we firstly include a full categorical variable 
indicating the respondent’s religion, indicating if they are Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, 
another type of Christian, Jewish, Islamic or of another religion. We include whether the 
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respondent is devoutly Catholic, and how important they deem tradition in life, a six-value 
ordinal variable stating their resemblance to someone who values familial and religious tradition 
very much, from “not like me” to “very much like me”. The importance of fun and pleasure to 
the respondent, or what we will call their level of hedonism, is included and uses the same six-
value scale. It is plausible some respondents interpreted the questions for the importance of 
tradition and fun to ask not just if they believed these phenomena to be important and desirable, 
but if they observed tradition or pursued pleasure and fun in their life actions, because they ask 
the respondent’s resemblance to an archetypal person who values these things. Thus, these 
variables weakly test our hypotheses that practicing and not just professing socially conservative 
beliefs will imply greater fertility through less restrictive childbearing choices. Finally, we 
include the age at which the respondent thinks a woman starts being too old to consider having a 
child, or “oldest childbearing age”, to test our hypothesis that people who tolerate later 
childbearing will wait longer themselves often until it is too late. This variable is only available 
for 2006 and 2018. 
We make the uncertain inference that all the covariates except for age and gender took on 
similar values for the period when the respondent was considering having or not having a child. 
Whether the household has a child one or younger or the number of children at the time of 
interview was determined by decisions in the past, and according to our hypotheses, these 
decisions are in part implied or determined by the values of these socioeconomic covariates that 
held when childbearing decisions were being made and not necessarily after their 
accomplishment. This constitutes the first possibility of error. Second, for our variables of 
whether the added a child or added an additional child, we make the inference that the 
respondent is the biological parent of a child one or younger or additional children in the 
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household, because only then could we associate the fertility of the household with their 
individual socioeconomic characteristics. Third, because the first interview in Hungary for ESS 
round year 2012 was conducted in October 2012, a child of age one or less at the time of 
interview was born at the earliest in October 2010, and thus could have been conceived as early 
as December of 2009. It is likely that for the child to be a result of the policies, his or her parents 
would have had to have conceived him or her at earliest in April 2010 when Fidesz won 
parliament. This error is mitigated by the fact that Fidesz announced its intentions to expand the 
family policy regime and had a track record of doing so in while in power in 1998-2002, as did 
the previous conservative government in 1990-4 (Spéder 2016, 187-8). 
From these fertility and explanatory variables, we formed two estimation samples for our 
regression models. The first we call our “households sample”, and this includes all ESS data 
from rounds 2002-2018 except for round year 2004, since data on religion in Hungary was 
omitted then, on Hungary and our base selection of nine other Central and East European 
countries of Austria, the other Visegrád countries of Slovakia, Czechia and Poland; and Estonia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. We did not include the other Baltic states of Latvia and 
Lithuania, or Romania and Serbia, because these countries were not surveyed at least once before 
and after the policies were implemented in Hungary. Its population is defined to be households in 
these 10 Central and East European countries from 2002-2018 excepting 2004. There is minimal 
sampling error due to the fact that the ESS best attempted to randomly sampled the same 
population. 
The second sample we call our “females sample” or “sample of women” or “individual-
level sample”, and this is for households whose heads or respondents were women of a fertile 
age, or 15-45, in round years 2006 and 2018 due to the availability of the variable for number of 
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children and is for as many of the ten Central and East European countries selected for the 
households estimation sample as is available. For the same reason as the households sample, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Serbia and Romania were dropped because they were not surveyed both 
before or in 2010 and after, and additionally, Czechia, Croatia and Ukraine were dropped 
because they were not surveyed in specifically both 2006 and 2018, the only rounds before and 
after the policy with data on the outcome variable of interest. Thus, the population of the sample 
of females is defined to be women in Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, and 
Bulgaria in 2006 and 2018. The sampling error for this population arises from the fact that the 
ESS randomly sampled households regardless of the gender of their heads, and that we drop 
observations with male heads. 
From these two samples, our model estimations dropped any observations for which all 
model variables were not available. From this, we derive our estimation samples, the summary 
statistics for which we provide below as the means for each variable for the treated and non-
treated groups, respectively. To obtain the estimations sample of the households sample, we 
dropped 25,769 observations to end at a sample of 82,886 observations. To arrive at the 
individual-level estimate sample, we dropped 1,337 observations to arrive at 4,084 observations. 
For the households sample, we estimated both a multivariate OLS model and two Probit 
models, and the Probit models dropped 46 more observations from the OLS estimation sample 
due to the additional limitations of the model form. Nevertheless, we only provide summary 
statistics for the OLS households estimation sample and mean the OLS estimations sample when 
we say the “households estimation sample”. We will refer what is properly the estimation sample 
of the households sample simply as the “households sample”, and the estimation sample of the 
females sample simply as the “females sample” for simplicity from here on. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Household Sample 
   
  Hungary Other 
 mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) 
      
Added child age one or less 0.0314 0.0360 
 (0.174) (0.186) 
Age 48.55 47.95 
 (18.23) (18.22) 
Female 0.566 0.560 
 (0.496) (0.496) 
Married 0.465 0.483 
 (0.499) (0.500) 
Perception of Income  
Very Difficult 0.127 0.113 
 (0.333) (0.317) 
Difficult 0.324 0.249 
 (0.468) (0.432) 
Coping 0.486 0.476 
 (0.500) (0.499) 
Comfortable 0.0633 0.162 
 (0.243) (0.369) 
Education Level   
Below Lower Secondary 0.0412 0.0316 
 (0.199) (0.175) 
Lower Secondary 0.206 0.190 
 (0.405) (0.393) 
Upper Secondary 0.553 0.500 
 (0.497) (0.500) 
Post-Secondary, non-Tertiary incl. 
Vocational 0.0586 0.0920 
 (0.235) (0.289) 
Tertiary 0.141 0.186 
 (0.348) (0.389) 
Hours of Work 39.50 39.06 
 (15.96) (18.02) 
Religion   
None 0.445 0.397 
 (0.497) (0.489) 
Roman Catholic 0.398 0.402 
 (0.490) (0.490) 
Protestant 0.143 0.0265 
 (0.350) (0.161) 
Eastern Orthodox 0.000295 0.142 
 (0.0172) (0.349) 
Other Christian 0.0102 0.0125 
 (0.101) (0.111) 
Jewish 0.000886 0.000509 
 (0.0298) (0.0226) 
Islamic 0.000295 0.0165 
 (0.0172) (0.127) 
Continued on next page 
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Non-Abrahamic 0.00177 0.00367 
 (0.0421) (0.0605) 
Devoutly Catholic 0.111 0.230 
 (0.314) (0.421) 
Importance of Tradition 4.543 4.476 
 (1.261) (1.258) 
Importance of Fun 4.643 3.666 
 (1.111) (1.452) 
   
Observations 10,160 72,726 
Notes: For each variable in each column, top number is mean, bottom is standard deviation. Values are across 
treated and non-treated groups. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Sample of Females 
   
 Hungary Other 
 mean mean 
VARIABLES (sd) (sd) 
      
Number of children 1.018 1.097 
 (1.113) (1.161) 
Age 33.02 32.02 
 (7.708) (8.518) 
Ever Lived with a Partner 0.769 0.742 
 (0.422) (0.437) 
Perception of Income  
Very Difficult 0.0787 0.0525 
 (0.270) (0.223) 
Difficult 0.274 0.169 
 (0.446) (0.375) 
Coping 0.551 0.529 
 (0.498) (0.499) 
Comfortable 0.0966 0.249 
 (0.296) (0.433) 
Education Level   
Below Lower Secondary 0.00716 0.0108 
 (0.0844) (0.103) 
Lower Secondary 0.147 0.139 
 (0.354) (0.346) 
Upper Secondary 0.597 0.513 
 (0.491) (0.500) 
Post-Secondary, non-Tertiary incl. 
Vocational 0.0662 0.0922 
 (0.249) (0.289) 
Tertiary 0.182 0.244 
 (0.387) (0.430) 
Hours of Work 38.66 35.43 
 (14.57) (18.30) 






Religion, aggregated  
None 0.578 0.369 
 (0.494) (0.483) 
Roman Catholic 0.301 0.488 
 (0.459) (0.500) 
Protestant 0.102 0.0332 
 (0.303) (0.179) 
Other 0.0197 0.110 
 (0.139) (0.313) 
Devoutly Catholic 0.0662 0.250 
 (0.249) (0.433) 
Importance of Tradition 4.163 4.282 
 (1.263) (1.278) 
Importance of Fun 4.698 4.044 
 (1.112) (1.297) 
Oldest Childbearing Age 41.68 43.06 
 (10.90) (13.55) 
   
Observations 559 3,525 
Notes: For each variable in each column, top number is mean, bottom is standard deviation. Values are across 





























CHAPTER 8: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
8.1 Models for Households 
In this section we estimate a series of difference in differences models to test the effect of 
Fidesz family policy on fertility in Hungary. The standard DID model includes a dummy 
variable for the post-reform period (in our case, 2012 or later), and indicator for the treatment 
group (Hungary), and their interaction, as follows: 
𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑗 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑗) + 𝛾𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 (1) 
where our subscripts 𝑗, 𝑐, and 𝑡 are for the household 𝑗, country 𝑐 and round year 𝑡, respectively, 
𝑇𝑗 is a dummy indicating if the households reside in the treated group, Hungary; 𝑃𝑡 is a dummy 
vector indicating the post-reform time period; 𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡 is the vector of fertility determinants such as 
age, schooling, perception of household income, and other variables selected from those 
described in Section 6.3 and whose exact selection is given in the summary statistics and 
regression tables; and 𝑗𝑐𝑡 is the error term capturing unobserved determinants of fertility.  
 We extend this model in three major ways. First, we estimate the DID model with 
country and year fixed effects. The fixed effect DID model allows to account for any common 
aggregate shocks to fertility (via each round year’s FEs 𝜃𝑡) and country-specific time-constant 
determinants of fertility (via country FEs 𝜇𝑐) such as geography and historical phenomena like 
the market-based and non-Soviet socialist system in Yugoslavia that Croatia and Slovenia 
inherited the effects of, and the “goulash” socialism in Hungary from 1960 onwards. The years 
take into account global phenomena that affected the whole population in that year, such as the 
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2008 financial crisis, which would have affected 2008 and 2010 surveys in different ways. Thus, 
the DID model becomes: 
𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿(𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑐) + 𝛾𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 (2) 
Second, we allow for the time-varying treatment effect and for testing for the parallel 
trend assumption by interacting our treatment group indicators with the set of year dummy 
variables both before and after the treatment, as follows: 
𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡(𝑇𝑐𝜃𝑡) + 𝛾𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 (3) 
or 
𝑌𝑗𝑐𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿(𝑇𝑐𝐷𝑡) + ∑ 𝛿𝑠(𝑇𝑐𝐷−𝑠𝑡) +
𝑆
𝑠=1 ∑ 𝛿𝑚(𝑇𝑐𝐷𝑚𝑡) +
𝑀
𝑚=1 𝛾𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡 + 𝑗𝑐𝑡 (3b) 
where 𝐷−𝑠𝑡 and 𝐷𝑚𝑡 indicate the sets of year dummy variables for the round years 𝑠 ESS rounds 
before the treatment and 𝑚 ESS rounds after the first round year of the policy, respectively, and 
𝐷𝑡 is simply for the first year of the policy. Our base year was 2008, two years before the first 
family policy changes, but two rounds before the first ESS round year in which outcomes could 
have been attributed to the policies, 2012. 
 Third, equation (3b) is estimated using the inverse propensity weights to balance 
observed characteristics between the treated group of Hungary and the control group of other 








where ?̂? is the predicted probability from the Probit model of the treatment indicator 𝑇𝑗 on the set 
of observed characteristics as well as household size prior to the treatment, that is, 2010. 
 Although we control for country and period fixed effects, which allows composing a non-
treated group of a wider variety of countries not similar to Hungary historically, culturally and 
the like, we only control for the changes within a region depending on if the region is Hungary 
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or not. Therefore, to avoid sending the effect of temporary country-wide phenomena on fertility 
to the error term, for our non-treatment group we select only nine Central and Eastern European 
countries. This is because Hungary has had especially generous family policies since the 1960s 
in comparison to the surrounding Visegrád countries when they were part of the Eastern Bloc, 
and countries of former Yugoslavia, so family policy has broadly not changed in character and 
thus can be captured in country fixed effects (Sucháček and Pytliková 2018, 218-9), (Spéder 
2016). The nine countries we select are the Visegrád countries of Slovakia, Czechia and Poland; 
Austria, Estonia, Ukraine, Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria. There is of course some error in this 
assumption, given country-specific non-policy changes and unnoticed policy changes 
determinant of fertility. 
 We first estimate a standard least-squares regression model on our binary outcome of 
adding a child one or less, defined by (3). After, we estimate a Probit model with the same 
covariates, fixed-effect and treatment and period terms, shown below: 
𝑃(𝑌∗ = 1| 𝜃𝑡 , 𝜇𝑐, 𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡) = Φ(𝑌 − =  𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡(𝑇𝑐𝜃𝑡) + 𝛾𝑍𝑗𝑐𝑡) (4) 
Where 𝑌 is defined the same as in 3, 𝑌∗ is the indicator function 1(𝑌 −  > 0) and Φ is the 
normal cumulative distribution function (Wooldridge 2013, 586). We also use inverse propensity 
weights in the Probit models. 
8.2 Estimates of Models at Household Level 
Table 3: Estimations of Multivariate and Probit models on Households 
    
  (1) OLS (1) Probit (3) Probit 
 
Added child one or 
less 
Added child one or 
less 
Additional child 
one or less 
VARIABLES coef coef coef 
        
Age -0.00410*** -0.0126 0.0160 
age2 2.54e-05*** -0.000302*** -0.000599*** 
Female 0.00431* 8.55e-05 -0.00292 
Married 0.0378*** 0.648*** 0.641*** 
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Perception of Income: base Very Difficult    
Difficult -0.00913*** -0.119** -0.105 
Coping -0.0157*** -0.217*** -0.217*** 
Comfortable -0.0283*** -0.403*** -0.365*** 
Level of Education: base Less than Lower 
Secondary    
Lower Secondary -0.0111*** -0.333*** -0.360*** 
Upper Secondary -0.00816** -0.347*** -0.511*** 
Post-Secondary, non-Tertiary incl.                
Vocational -0.00967** -0.384*** -0.512*** 
Tertiary 0.00344 -0.244** -0.445*** 
Hours of Work 0.000262*** 0.00241** 0.00206* 
Religion    
None 0.00817** 0.104** 0.0526 
Roman Catholic 0.00797** 0.135** 0.186** 
Protestant -0.0244*** -0.332** -0.308** 
Eastern Orthodox -0.00796 -0.109 -0.0697 
Jewish -0.0164*** (omitted) (omitted) 
Islamic -0.00254 -0.139 -0.0962 
Non-Abrahamic -0.0179** -0.440** -0.264 
Devoutly Catholic -0.00778** -0.151** -0.0876 
Importance of Tradition 0.00522*** 0.0835*** 0.0773*** 
Importance of Fun -0.00172** -0.0179 0.0420*** 
Country: base Austria    
Bulgaria 0.000620 -0.0101 -0.140 
Czechia -0.0137*** -0.279*** -0.298*** 
Estonia 0.0198*** 0.323*** 0.282*** 
Croatia -0.0118*** -0.182*** -0.184** 
Poland 0.0106*** 0.138** 0.0587 
Slovenia 0.0201*** 0.317*** 0.244*** 
Slovakia -0.00935*** -0.125** -0.0794 
Ukraine 0.0126** 0.126 -0.0768 
Hungary -0.0178*** -0.345*** -0.395*** 
Round Year: base 2008    
2002 0.00287 0.00665 0.0479 
2006 0.000224 0.00745 -0.00952 
2010 0.00836*** 0.129*** 0.115** 
2012 -0.000676 0.00473 -5.69e-05 
2014 -0.000754 0.00428 -0.0242 
2016 0.00246 0.0690 0.0641 
2018 0.0138*** 0.250*** 0.263*** 
Treatment x Year: base 2008    
Hungary 2002 0.00313 0.225 0.357* 
Hungary 2006 0.0238** 0.388** 0.297 
Hungary 2010 0.0102 0.254* 0.246 
Hungary 2012 0.0164** 0.334** 0.387** 
Hungary 2014 0.00477 0.0351 0.240 
Hungary 2016 0.00548 0.102 0.155 
Hungary 2018 -0.00128 -0.265 -0.611* 
Constant 0.132*** -1.081*** -1.688*** 
    
Observations 82,886 82,840 82,840 
R-squared 0.037 N/A N/A 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 Firstly, for our covariates, the predicted effects of being married, Roman Catholic, and 
valuing tradition on having or adding a child recently were confirmed in all models in our 
sample. We also found that being Protestant predicted not having a child in the last two years. In 
the multinomial model, valuing fun had the predicted negative effect on childbearing. 
Interestingly, being Roman Catholic and attending a service at least monthly not only did not 
have the predicted positive effect, but a significant negative effect on childbearing. However, 
because of the interpretability of the questions for the importance of tradition and fun as asking if 
the respondent observes tradition or pursues pleasure in their life instead of merely professing a 
positive attitude, our hypothesis that socially conservative practice matters more than mere belief 
is partially confirmed. In our Probit model on adding a child, valuing tradition had the predicted 
effect, but valuing fun was not insignificant, and in the Probit model for having an additional 
child, fun actually significantly predicted an increase. Interestingly, higher income predicted a 
significant decrease in the likelihood of having a child in the last two years in reference to 
finding living on income very difficult, except for the jump from an assessment of living with 
present income being very difficult to difficult in having an additional child. 
Age in the middle range modelled with the polynomial of age showed a significant 
increase of fertility for the OLS model, but predicted lower fertility in the Probit models, likely 
due to the middle age in these samples being higher than the typical age at first childbirth in the 
late twenties across these countries. A higher education level across both male and female 
household heads generally predicted a decrease in fertility. 
Importantly, in all our models we saw an increase in the likelihood of having a child in 
the last two years in 2012 when in the treated group of Hungary, but otherwise no significant 
effect for being treated in the years after. This same effect was seen on having an additional 
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child, except that the accumulation of Fidesz family policies in 2018 predicted a lower likelihood 
of having an additional child at a significance level of 0.1. Of course, the coefficients for the 
Probit models do not tell us the magnitude of the change on probability, so we estimate the 
marginal effects: 
Table 4: Average Partial and Marginal Effects of Treatment, Round Year and their Interaction 
   
     
 
Added child one 
or less 







     
   
Hungary   
Other .03298*** - 
Hungary .0244715*** - 
Round Year   
2002 .0273352*** - 
2006 .0318936*** - 
2008 .0226266*** - 
2010 .0356338*** - 
2012 .0300917*** - 
2014 .0233916*** - 
2016 .0279994*** - 
2018 .0317491*** - 
Treatment x Round Year   
Other 2002 .0305356*** - 
Other 2006 .0305843*** - 
Other 2008 .0301355*** - 
Other 2010 .0386759*** - 
Other 2012 .0304199*** - 
Other 2014 .0303927*** - 
Other 2016 .0345075*** - 
Other 2018 .0484446*** - 
Hungary 2002 .0239251*** -.0066105 
Hungary 2006 .033275*** .00026907 
Hungary 2008 .0145195*** -.015616*** 
Hungary 2010 .0324455*** -.0062304 
Hungary 2012 .0297441*** -.0006757 
Hungary 2014 .0158506*** -.0145421*** 
Hungary 2016 .0210705*** -.013437** 
Hungary 2018 .0140541*** -.0343905*** 
   
Observations 82,840  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The values in the first column of each row show the average partial effect (APE), or the 
average of the predicted probabilities of the outcome across all observations in the sample with 
the specified value of the independent variable. The alternative, which we do not use, would be 
the partial effect at the average. The values in the second column show the average marginal 
effect (AME) of being treated for each round year (Wooldridge 2013, 592). Because the 
treatment variable is binary, its marginal effect for any given set of values of the covariates is 
just the difference between the predicted value when in Hungary and the predicted value for a 
control. Thus, the AME values when present are just the differences between the average partial 
effects for each treatment alternative for a given year. The significance of the values is given in 
asterisks according to the key. 
The policies as they stood from 2010-2012 predicted adding a child at a probability of 
2.9%, much more than most other years in Hungary, but not for 2010, whose probability for 
having a child was 3.2%. For 2012, the decrease in probability of having a child in the last two 
years for being in Hungary was insignificant, causing less concern. However, the average 
marginal effect shows a decrease in the likelihood of having a child when in Hungary versus the 
control group for every year after. 
8.3 Model at the Individual Level 
For women in our seven Central and Eastern European countries in 2006 and 2018, we 
estimated a difference in differences Poisson model due to our outcome variable being the 
number of children born to the respondent in her lifetime, a count variable.  
𝑦∗ = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑐 + 𝛿(𝜃𝑡𝜇𝑐) + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑖 (5) 
 (5) is the underlying function whose coefficients are shown in the estimations table, and 
here the covariates in 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡 vary from the households models slightly in that we replace whether 
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the respondent is married with whether she has ever lived with a partner, and added what she 
considers the oldest childbearing age for a woman is. This latent function is incorporated into the 
Poisson model that is what we estimate: 
 𝐸( 𝑦 | 𝜃𝑡 , 𝜇𝑐 , 𝑍𝑖𝑐𝑡) = exp(y𝑖
∗ − 𝑖) (5b) 
 𝐸 indicates the expected value under the Poisson distribution, exp indicates an 
exponential function of usually the natural logarithm and 𝑦 is the number of children a woman 
has had in her lifetime, here not the actual value of the observation. Because there was only one 
round before and one round after the policy implementation, year fixed effects reduced to just 
indicating if the observation was pre- or post-ante, and the DID interaction term reduced to the 
factor of the post-ante and treatment variables. We retained country fixed effects, and use inverse 
propensity weights as in models (3) and (4). 
8.4 Estimate of Model at the Individual Level 
Table 5: Estimation of Poisson Model on Females 
  
  (1) 
 Number of children 
VARIABLES coef 
    
Age 0.214*** 
age2 -0.00277*** 
Ever Lived with a Partner 3.024*** 




Level of Education: base Less than Lower Secondary 
Lower Secondary -0.721*** 
Upper Secondary -0.815*** 
Post-Secondary, non-Tertiary incl. 
Vocational -0.884*** 
Tertiary -0.836*** 
Hours of Work 0.00210* 
Religion, aggregated – base None  
Roman Catholic 0.436*** 
Protestant 0.0806 
Other -0.0443 




Due to the logarithmic function, we can roughly interpret our coefficients as elasticities, 
or the proportional change, of the expected number of children a woman will have for a one-unit 
increase in each independent variable. Given this, we observed that women around the median 
childbearing age of 30 have slightly fewer children, predicting a decrease of less than 1%. Every 
increase in education level from the lowest of below secondary predicts a significant decrease in 
the number of children a woman will have, with the greatest decrease in the number of children 
of roughly 88% occurring when she has been educated up to the post-secondary yet non-tertiary 
level. Our hypotheses that Roman Catholic, more traditional and less hedonistic women have 
more children was confirmed, however being devoutly Catholic had no significant effect. Being 
Catholic increased the number of children by roughly 43%, whereas being traditional or less 
hedonistic only predicted a roughly 9% increase. 
Disappointingly for the policies at their stage of development by 2018 however, being in 
Hungary in 2018 predicted a roughly 61% decrease in the number of children a fertile woman 
would have in her lifetime at a significance level of .01. This is important because the number of 
children a woman has had in her lifetime allows us to infer the effect of the policies on 
Importance of Tradition 0.0910*** 
Importance of Fun -0.0937*** 
Oldest Childbearing Age -0.00453 







Period: base Pre-ante -0.0871** 
Hungary x Period -0.618*** 
Constant -6.081*** 
  
Log pseudolikelihood -14,768.98 
Observations 4,084 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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childbearing behavior for every year since 2010, as opposed to whether a household added a 
child in the last two years like for our household models. By 2018, family policy of all forms 
were greatly expanded, with an increase in amounts and eligibility for allowances, tax and 
housing benefits, access and affordability of nurseries and kindergartens, and part-time work for 
mothers with young children. Most Hungarian women in the sample were fertile every year since 
2010 but still were likely to have fewer children, as the mean age in Hungary was about 33.02 
with a standard deviation of 7.708, putting the youngest woman within the bounds of the 
standard deviation at 18 in 2010. 
For a more precise estimate of marginal effects, however, we estimate the expected 
values and incidence-rate ratio of the treatment for the treatment, year, and its interaction; and 
treatment and year, respectively. 





 Number of children 
VARIABLES coef 
    







Treatment x Period 
Other pre-ante 1.093827*** 
Other post-ante 1.002595*** 
Hungary pre-ante 1.547865*** 
Hungary post-ante .7646738*** 
    





Because the Poisson model predicts the expected number of children to each woman 
based off her characteristics and not simply the actual number of children she has had, we 
calculate the average expected values for certain variables of interest in Table 6. Being in 
Hungary in 2018 or post-ante predicted an expected value of the number of children of .76, much 
lower than Hungary before the policy where the average number of children a woman had was 
1.54, or 1.09 in the control group before the policy and 1.00 in the control group after. In general, 
women during their fertile career had fewer children across our seven countries in 2018 than in 
2006 but being in Hungary makes this even lower. 














    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The incidence-rate ratio is the ratio of the expected value for when the given variable 
increases by one from a base over its expected value at the base. This is the same for all values of 
the other covariates and DID variables (StataCorp 2019, 1084). Thus we see the expected 
number of children to a woman in Hungary during the policy was almost half of that of a woman 










CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 Interestingly, only the policies in their form up to 2012 had a significant positive effect 
on fertility. From 2010-12, the main expansions to policy were tax deductions and benefits for 
housing, which contributed to the incomes and possession of final goods of potential parents. 
Most potential parents have always desired a certain threshold of income and final goods before 
having a child, and the Fidesz policies have tried to meet these conditions.  
However, the newer phenomenon is women desiring to either work part or full-time 
while with a young child, which in turn requires that the woman be able to find part time work or 
obtain childcare for her young child, respectively. Fidesz only started to seriously address these 
concerns in 2014, progressively expanding provisions each year after. Women could start 
working at first after the child turned one and then for the whole course of receiving the generous 
wage-tied GYED in 2014-16, and in 2014 employers were obliged to offer part-time work to 
female employees turned mothers, and were given subsidies to offer part-time work to women 
with children under three whom they did not previously employ. 
Despite these significant efforts to reduce conflict between home and work for women 
with young children, fertility did not increase in 2014 and after according to our results. This was 
the case even with the expansion of traditional monetary and tax benefits from 2012 on, which 
included an increase in the cap to the GYED, turning tax deductions to a tax credit for poorer 
families, and increases in the eligibility and amounts of subsidies for the interest or payments of 
housing loans and mortgages. 
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There are some possibilities of error. In our households model, we are not measuring 
whether a child was born in the last two years to a particular woman, but if one was born in 
general and added to the household, whether parented or adopted by the respondent. This means 
that the fewer fertile women in the Hungarian population, the smaller the probability that a fertile 
woman will be able to contribute a child to a household. Since the late 1970s, the TFR in 
Hungary has been below replacement, and since 1995, below 1.6. This would have started to 
lessen the number of fertile women in the population in roughly 1995, when women born to the 
oldest cohort contributing to below-replacement fertility became fertile at age 15. But the TFR 
started to significantly drop to around 1.5 in 1990, where women born in this period entered their 
fertility careers at the earliest in 2005. Fertile women in the first policy year of 2012 were born 
the earliest in 1967, but on average 30 years before in 1982, right after the TFR began declining. 
Thus, there are fewer fertile women for the later years in which the policies were implemented. 
This may have artificially declined the fertility outcomes we saw in households, because the 
average woman may have been having more children from 2010 than the average household. 
However, this error does not affect our Poisson model, reinforcing the grim conclusion that the 
policies did not increase fertility after their first phase. 
There is also the possibility that income gained or retained from family policy allowances 
and tax benefits were counted by respondents in the income with which they expressed their 
comfort in the variable for perception of income. This means that the benefits of the policies 
determinant of fertility may have been captured in the income variable and not reflected in the 
treatment and year interaction term for round years after 2010, or that there was endogeneity 
between these two variables due to the policy being determinant of income. However, this effect 
is likely minimal because tax benefits save and do not make income for the household, and 
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moreover they save income only in the year after it was made; and allowances from the state are 
usually counted as separate from income. 
Additionally, some of the labor market policies may have not taken effect yet in the years 
since 2014, resulting in part-time work not being available to women at employers, whether 
these women were employed or not while deciding to have a child. Subsidies are not enough for 
employers to begin offering part-time work to women they did not previously employ right 
away, and even creating the obligation to employers to offer part-time work to their female 
employees with young children does not imply quick compliance even if they would like to 
comply. Kapitány and Makay mention how compliance started first in the public sector, then 
spread to the private sector, implying gradual observance of the reforms (2014). 
However, all these considerations only serve to mitigate rather than eliminate the 
likelihood that for their whole existence, policies seeking to reconcile the home and work life of 
mothers did not strongly incentivize childbearing in Hungary, and that the increase in allowances 
and tax and housing benefits only increased fertility in their first stage, while further expansions 
could not even maintain the slight increase in fertility when measured by whether a family added 
an additional child (see Table 3). The prevalence of the modern home/work life conditional 
childbearing desires of preferring part- or full-time work while taking care of a young child 
cannot be significantly doubted given the literature. These desires in turn imply the need to find 
part-time work, or to find an accessible early childhood care center for their child if the woman 
prefers full-time work. The policies have facilitated both, though more strongly in offering part-
time work than creating or improving early childhood care centers, or making them more 
affordable.. 
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The first way in which these policies in their fullest form (barring incomplete 
implementation) could have not increased fertility is that they did not satisfy the childbearing 
conditions of people they sought to meet. The second is that they did meet the targeted 
conditions but failed to meet others.  
Allowances and tax and housing benefits aimed to meet the conditions relating to income 
and the possession of final goods. Income is itself necessary to meet expenditures, and expenses 
are incurred to obtain final goods. The housing benefits and lately the new 2019 subsidies for 
cars aim to get straight to the heart of the matter by obtaining the final goods people need to raise 
children. But despite larger relative increases in appropriations to housing subsidies since 2010 
(Vida 2019, 7), allowances and tax benefits still form the largest portion of the state budget for 
the family policy system28. These are beneficial insofar as they help meet expenditures for the 
final economic goods people need or want. It is then possible that despite their large increases 
and amounts relative to the region of Central and Eastern Europe, not just the housing benefits 
but allowances and tax benefits combined with job income that can be reasonably expected do 
not meet people’s baseline expenditures for having and raising children.  
Family expenditures can increase due to an increase in costs or due to a change in the 
desired composition of goods, i.e. to higher quality goods. In part, people started to desire a 
basket of higher quality goods for their children from 1990 on due to pent-up consumer demand. 
However, the more decisive determinant of desired good composition is whether the child is a 
producer or final good, and children already became final goods to parents well before 1990 
under socialism (Becker 1960), (Andorka, et al. 1999). This combined with the fact that the 
 
28
Note these are budget appropriations (“költségvetési előirányzatok”), and not amounts the state spent by the end of 
the year, which would indicate people not claiming available housing benefits rather than a low availability of them. 
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market economy took away direct and indirect price controls means that expenditures have 
increased primarily because of an increase in costs, and potential parents have little direct control 
on market prices. Thus, it is necessary to determine the sizes and distribution across the 
population of family expenditures for each additional child to more accurately assess if the 
monetary and tax provisions of Fidesz family policy were really not successful in meeting the 
conditions people have regarding income and final goods29. Therefore, we cannot conclude if the 
policies did not increase fertility because they did not meet people’s conditions regarding the 
possession of necessary final goods they sought to meet from this study, but it is one 
possibility30. 
However, the policies that sought to reconcile home and work did largely meet the 
home/work life conditions of potential parents, and still they and the other policies in place from 
2014 on did not predict an increase in childbirths. The reason for this is either that these 
home/work life conditions are joined with other unmet and hard-to-meet conditions, or are only 
limiting and not circumstantial conditions, or are limiting conditions that are also opposed (i.e., 
the choice to not have a child is ideal), or the potential parent did not attempt to realize his or her 
childbearing desire conditioned by work/home life preferences. 
While some women may demand a certain dynamic between life in and outside the home 
before having a child but actively oppose its realization, this is likely rare, and moreover the 
 
29
I thank Dr. Boone Turchi of my thesis committee for bringing this to my attention. 
 
30
We could theoretically determine if the policies failed to increase fertility due to not meeting expenditures for 
children for respondents who interpreted allowance and tax benefits as being part of income when asked about their 
perception of income, because the question asked how comfortably the household lived on its income, or how well it 
met expenses. However, we have no way of identifying these respondents, and perception of income would need to 
be tested across both people who counted policy benefits as income and those who did not to obtain statistically 
significant results. 
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policies realized many home/work life conditions whether or not a person opposed them. Given 
this and the fact that people usually try to realize their veritable choices, it is more likely that 
potential parents have other conditions that have been unmet. Our cultural variables uncover 
some of these attitudes at a more individual psychological level than economic proxies like 
income or female employment and education can show. More traditional household heads, both 
men and women, were more likely to have a child in the recent past, and more traditional and 
less pleasure-seeking women were also more likely to have more children over their lifetime. 
Although the level of devotion did not matter, being Roman Catholic across models predicted 
more recent and higher net childbearing for both men and women. 
It is not that potential parents with more socially conservative attitudes and practices have 
fewer or no home/work life conditions and that more modern parents do, but rather that their 
conditions are easier to realize. Traditionally in Hungary, women demanded to be able to stay at 
home before having a child, and even socialist policies did not significantly create tolerance 
towards working while raising a young child at least due to their oppressive implementation and 
associations. Women instead tried to have children at a young age in order to carve out a private 
life that was less vulnerable to cultural intrusions of the state (Kamarás and Spéder 2008). The 
traditional demand to not work at all as opposed to tolerating both staying at home and some 
work as many women do today is in fact more restrictive in terms of the scope of conditions. 
Instead, the restrictiveness of modern childbearing conditions arises from their difficulty to be 
realized. Although modern Hungarian women are amenable to both staying at home or working 
while the mother of a young child, between the two, they generally prefer working; and finding 
part-time work or suitable childcare to allow full-time work is still difficult despite policy 
innovations. Thus the preference for a more demanding alternative among what is, granted, a 
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wider set of allowed childrearing arrangements than in the past is what accounts for the 
restrictiveness of modern childbearing desires. 
The cultural attitudes and practices whose effect on fertility we confirm in our sample 
determine some of these other modern conditions for childbearing that the policies could not 
satisfy. However, the trouble is that the government either cannot or is not ethically permitted to 
use policy to try to change these attitudes and behaviors to increase childbirths. To make people 
like an activity or custom, it is often necessary to first force them to engage in it, and making 
people observe familial or religious traditions, or turn them away from the pursuit of instant 
pleasure is unethically coercive and likely to lead to resistance or violence. Softer methods like 
hosting the World Conference of Families in 2017 are likely to be seen with cynicism as a 
dishonest approach that does not openly state its motives. 
We confirmed that the higher the education level of a woman, the fewer children she 
tends to have confirmed past results on fertility in the West, but we found an increase in children 
when she worked more hours at her last job. But saying a more educated woman is less likely to 
have many children does not say much. Higher education does not preclude having as many 
children as a less educated woman on its own, even if it implies more involvement in the 
workforce after schooling as long as the work is not full-time31. Instead, it stands in as a proxy of 
other real conditions that a woman gives herself that prevent her from having children. One can 
speculate as to its contents, but it is some life activity or occupation that either by its nature 
precludes childrearing or which the highly educated woman prefers to not mix with childrearing, 
 
31
That is, if we already know a woman has found part-time work because of her higher education level, this does 
not prevent her from having children because she likely has the more modern home/work life conditions we 
discussed as a hypothesis. If she has full-time work, however, this usually requires the outside provision of childcare 
in order for her to desire having a child. 
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and which circumstances realize or which she realizes, in which case she ideally chooses to not 
have children. Our results suggest that it is not a higher number of hours worked. 
Finally, the policies may have not met the expected expenditures for children of potential 
parents. But even if the cultural conditions preventative of childbearing become less prevalent – 
on average, more men and women are non-religious than Catholic, fewer are devoutly Catholic 
in Hungary than in the rest of Eastern Europe, people value fun and pleasure just as much as 
tradition, with women valuing it even more (see Table 1) - and thus merely helping potential 
parents meet the costs of childrearing would increase fertility, this is at least not fiscally 
responsible, and likely not fiscally sustainable. Fidesz has increased the spending on all forms of 
family policy provisions from 3.5% of GDP in 2010 to 4.8% of GDP in 2018 (Vida 2019, 7). 
Government spending depends upon revenue from taxation, and taxes can only increase in the 
long term if the private economy is faring well. Some increases in allowance, tax and housing 
provisions are likely possible, but a small increase will likely not significantly close the gap 
between income and expenditures so as to increase childbirth. 
Therefore, the Hungarian government has some room to maneuver in policy in hopes of 
increasing fertility, but not much. The main instruments that governments like that of Hungary 
have at their disposal to increase childbirths under ethical constraints are economic, but our 
results suggest it is cultural and not economic conditions that are preventing a significant rise in 
births to replacement level in Hungary. The cultural instruments a state can ethically employ are 
likely to not be very effective. A deeper change in childbearing choices and behavior arising 
from civil society, private institutions, and the activities and experiences of people is necessary 
to significantly increase and then sustain fertility, and whether this change in attitude towards 
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APPENDIX 1: DEFINED VARIABLES 
Table 8: Variables in Stata 
Variable Name Type Description 
Dependent Variables 
anychild1 Binary 1 = If a child of age one or younger at time 
of interview lives in household 
addchild1 Binary 1 = If a child of age one or younger at time 
of interview and another child live in 
household 
children Count Number of children respondent has given 
birth to/fathered who survived childbirth 
DID Variables 
cntryid Categorical Code number and two-letter label for each 
country 
rndyear Categorical Year for ESS Round, every two years from 
2002 to 2018 
treatment Binary 1 = If respondent in Hungary i.e. treated 
population 
Covariates 
female Binary 1 = Respondent is female 
age Continuous Age of respondent in years 
married Binary 1 = Respondent is married 
religion Categorical Religion of respondent, values: None, 
Roman Catholic, Protestant, Eastern 
Orthodox, Other Christian Denomination, 
Jewish, Islamic, Non-Abrahamic Religion 
howcath Binary 1 = If respondent is Roman Catholic and 
attends a service at least once a month 
imptrad Ordinal Six-value, 1 = Not like me to 6 = Very 
much like me. If person resembles someone 
to whom tradition, religion and familial 
customs are important  
impfun Ordinal Six-value, 1 = Not like me to 6 = Very 
much like me. If person resembles someone 
who seeks fun and finds pleasure important 
edulev Ordinal Five-value, 1 = Less than lower secondary, 
2 = Lower secondary, 3 = Upper secondary, 
4 = Post-secondary, non teritiary including 
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vocational, 5 = Tertiary. Harmonized 
EISCED values 
hincfeel Ordinal Four-value, How respondent feels about 
living on present income, 1 = Very difficult 
to 4 = Comfortable 
hrswk Continuous Number of hours respondent worked at last 
job, including jobs held in last seven days 
and those before seven days ago at time of 
interview 
Variables for the Individual-Level Model 
livedptn Binary 1 = If respondent ever lived with a partner 
everwrk Binary 1 = If respondent has ever held a job 
wrkschl Binary 1 = If respondent’s main activity in last 
seven days was work, school, or active job 
search while unemployed 0 = Other 
toooldcld Continuous Age respondent thinks a woman is too old 
to consider having a child, -1 = Never too 
old 
nevtoooldcld Binary 1 = If respondent thinks woman never too 
old to consider having a child 
agefstcld Continuous Age at which respondent had first child 
Inverse Propensity Weight Variables 
hhsize Continuous Number of members of household 























APPENDIX 2: COMPILATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY DATA 
The data used for the models was constructed from different data files offered by the 
European Social Survey. The base data set was Edition 1.0 of the Cumulative Data Set, which 
has data for rounds 1-8 (2002-2016) for variables if and only if their questions were asked at 
least more than once for the rounds in question. This means that questions from the Timing of 
Life survey are omitted in the Cumulative Data set for round 3 in addition to those of round 9. 
We thus appended data from ESS rounds 3 (2006) and 9 (2018) to obtain Timing of Life 
data, identifying observations by the variable IDNO, which is unique within each country for 
each round (https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/faq.html). We found that there were 
members of households in round 6 (2012) for whom data was missing in the cumulative file, and 
so we appended the data for round 6. Particularly, there was a household with 24 members in 
2012, but the cumulative data’s largest household in 2012 had 18 members. 
Precisely put, we appended the Integrated File for round 3, edition 3.7 and Integrated File 
for round 9, edition 2.0, and the Integrated File for round 6, edition 2.4 to the Cumulative Data 
Set 1.0 by identifying unique observations and retaining the values in the cumulative data for any 
conflicting variables, and retaining data on all variables found across the set if the variable was 
found in only one file. The links to the data sets: 
Cumulative File, edition 1.0: https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/downloadwizard/ 
Integrated File, Round 3 edition 3.7: 
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ESS3e03_7&y=2006 
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Integrated File, Round 6 edition 2.4: 
https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/download.html?file=ESS6e02_4&y=2012 
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